The Critique of Pure Reason - Appendix - Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)

                        APPENDIX.



        Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of

                      Pure Reason.



  The result of all the dialectical attempts of pure reason not only

confirms the truth of what we have already proved in our

Transcendental Analytic, namely, that all inferences which would

lead us beyond the limits of experience are fallacious and groundless,

but it at the same time teaches us this important lesson, that human

reason has a natural inclination to overstep these limits, and that

transcendental ideas are as much the natural property of the reason as

categories are of the understanding. There exists this difference,

however, that while the categories never mislead us, outward objects

being always in perfect harmony therewith, ideas are the parents of

irresistible illusions, the severest and most subtle criticism being

required to save us from the fallacies which they induce.

  Whatever is grounded in the nature of our powers will be found to be

in harmony with the final purpose and proper employment of these

powers, when once we have discovered their true direction and aim.

We are entitled to suppose, therefore, that there exists a mode of

employing transcendental ideas which is proper and immanent; although,

when we mistake their meaning, and regard them as conceptions of

actual things, their mode of application is transcendent and delusive.

For it is not the idea itself, but only the employment of the idea

in relation to possible experience, that is transcendent or

immanent. An idea is employed transcendently, when it is applied to an

object falsely believed to be adequate with and to correspond to it;

imminently, when it is applied solely to the employment of the

understanding in the sphere of experience. Thus all errors of

subreptio- of misapplication, are to be ascribed to defects of

judgement, and not to understanding or reason.

  Reason never has an immediate relation to an object; it relates

immediately to the understanding alone. It is only through the

understanding that it can be employed in the field of experience. It

does not form conceptions of objects, it merely arranges them and

gives to them that unity which they are capable of possessing when the

sphere of their application has been extended as widely as possible.

Reason avails itself of the conception of the understanding for the

sole purpose of producing totality in the different series. This

totality the understanding does not concern itself with; its only

occupation is the connection of experiences, by which series of

conditions in accordance with conceptions are established. The

object of reason is, therefore, the understanding and its proper

destination. As the latter brings unity into the diversity of

objects by means of its conceptions, so the former brings unity into

the diversity of conceptions by means of ideas; as it sets the final

aim of a collective unity to the operations of the understanding,

which without this occupies itself with a distributive unity alone.

  I accordingly maintain that transcendental ideas can never be

employed as constitutive ideas, that they cannot be conceptions of

objects, and that, when thus considered, they assume a fallacious

and dialectical character. But, on the other hand, they are capable of

an admirable and indispensably necessary application to objects- as

regulative ideas, directing the understanding to a certain aim, the

guiding lines towards which all its laws follow, and in which they all

meet in one point. This point- though a mere idea (focus imaginarius),

that is, not a point from which the conceptions of the understanding

do really proceed, for it lies beyond the sphere of possible

experience- serves, notwithstanding, to give to these conceptions

the greatest possible unity combined with the greatest possible

extension. Hence arises the natural illusion which induces us to

believe that these lines proceed from an object which lies out of

the sphere of empirical cognition, just as objects reflected in a

mirror appear to be behind it. But this illusion- which we may

hinder from imposing upon us- is necessary and unavoidable, if we

desire to see, not only those objects which lie before us, but those

which are at a great distance behind us; that is to say, when, in

the present case, we direct the aims of the understanding, beyond

every given experience, towards an extension as great as can

possibly be attained.

  If we review our cognitions in their entire extent, we shall find

that the peculiar business of reason is to arrange them into a system,

that is to say, to give them connection according to a principle. This

unity presupposes an idea- the idea of the form of a whole (of

cognition), preceding the determinate cognition of the parts, and

containing the conditions which determine a priori to every part its

place and relation to the other parts of the whole system. This

idea, accordingly, demands complete unity in the cognition of the

understanding- not the unity of a contingent aggregate, but that of

a system connected according to necessary laws. It cannot be

affirmed with propriety that this idea is a conception of an object;

it is merely a conception of the complete unity of the conceptions

of objects, in so far as this unity is available to the

understanding as a rule. Such conceptions of reason are not derived

from nature; on the contrary, we employ them for the interrogation and

investigation of nature, and regard our cognition as defective so long

as it is not adequate to them. We admit that such a thing as pure

earth, pure water, or pure air, is not to be discovered. And yet we

require these conceptions (which have their origin in the reason, so

far as regards their absolute purity and completeness) for the purpose

of determining the share which each of these natural causes has in

every phenomenon. Thus the different kinds of matter are all ref erred

to earths, as mere weight; to salts and inflammable bodies, as pure

force; and finally, to water and air, as the vehicula of the former,

or the machines employed by them in their operations- for the

purpose of explaining the chemical action and reaction of bodies in

accordance with the idea of a mechanism. For, although not actually so

expressed, the influence of such ideas of reason is very observable in

the procedure of natural philosophers.

  If reason is the faculty of deducing the particular from the

general, and if the general be certain in se and given, it is only

necessary that the judgement should subsume the particular under the

general, the particular being thus necessarily determined. I shall

term this the demonstrative or apodeictic employment of reason. If,

however, the general is admitted as problematical only, and is a

mere idea, the particular case is certain, but the universality of the

rule which applies to this particular case remains a problem.

Several particular cases, the certainty of which is beyond doubt,

are then taken and examined, for the purpose of discovering whether

the rule is applicable to them; and if it appears that all the

particular cases which can be collected follow from the rule, its

universality is inferred, and at the same time, all the causes which

have not, or cannot be presented to our observation, are concluded

to be of the same character with those which we have observed. This

I shall term the hypothetical employment of the reason.

  The hypothetical exercise of reason by the aid of ideas employed

as problematical conceptions is properly not constitutive. That is

to say, if we consider the subject strictly, the truth of the rule,

which has been employed as an hypothesis, does not follow from the use

that is made of it by reason. For how can we know all the possible

cases that may arise? some of which may, however, prove exceptions

to the universality of the rule. This employment of reason is merely

regulative, and its sole aim is the introduction of unity into the

aggregate of our particular cognitions, and thereby the

approximating of the rule to universality.

  The object of the hypothetical employment of reason is therefore the

systematic unity of cognitions; and this unity is the criterion of the

truth of a rule. On the other hand, this systematic unity- as a mere

idea- is in fact merely a unity projected, not to be regarded as

given, but only in the light of a problem- a problem which serves,

however, as a principle for the various and particular exercise of the

understanding in experience, directs it with regard to those cases

which are not presented to our observation, and introduces harmony and

consistency into all its operations.

  All that we can be certain of from the above considerations is

that this systematic unity is a logical principle, whose aim is to

assist the understanding, where it cannot of itself attain to rules,

by means of ideas, to bring all these various rules under one

principle, and thus to ensure the most complete consistency and

connection that can be attained. But the assertion that objects and

the understanding by which they are cognized are so constituted as

to be determined to systematic unity, that this may be postulated a

priori, without any reference to the interest of reason, and that we

are justified in declaring all possible cognitions- empirical and

others- to possess systematic unity, and to be subject to general

principles from which, notwithstanding their various character, they

are all derivable such an assertion can be founded only upon a

transcendental principle of reason, which would render this systematic

unity not subjectively and logically- in its character of a method,

but objectively necessary.

  We shall illustrate this by an example. The conceptions of the

understanding make us acquainted, among many other kinds of unity,

with that of the causality of a substance, which is termed power.

The different phenomenal manifestations of the same substance appear

at first view to be so very dissimilar that we are inclined to

assume the existence of just as many different powers as there are

different effects- as, in the case of the human mind, we have feeling,

consciousness, imagination, memory, wit, analysis, pleasure, desire

and so on. Now we are required by a logical maxim to reduce these

differences to as small a number as possible, by comparing them and

discovering the hidden identity which exists. We must inquire, for

example, whether or not imagination (connected with consciousness),

memory, wit, and analysis are not merely different forms of

understanding and reason. The idea of a fundamental power, the

existence of which no effort of logic can assure us of, is the problem

to be solved, for the systematic representation of the existing

variety of powers. The logical principle of reason requires us to

produce as great a unity as is possible in the system of our

cognitions; and the more the phenomena of this and the other power are

found to be identical, the more probable does it become, that they are

nothing but different manifestations of one and the same power,

which may be called, relatively speaking, a fundamental power. And

so with other cases.

  These relatively fundamental powers must again be compared with each

other, to discover, if possible, the one radical and absolutely

fundamental power of which they are but the manifestations. But this

unity is purely hypothetical. It is not maintained, that this unity

does really exist, but that we must, in the interest of reason, that

is, for the establishment of principles for the various rules

presented by experience, try to discover and introduce it, so far as

is practicable, into the sphere of our cognitions.

  But the transcendental employment of the understanding would lead us

to believe that this idea of a fundamental power is not problematical,

but that it possesses objective reality, and thus the systematic unity

of the various powers or forces in a substance is demanded by the

understanding and erected into an apodeictic or necessary principle.

For, without having attempted to discover the unity of the various

powers existing in nature, nay, even after all our attempts have

failed, we notwithstanding presuppose that it does exist, and may

be, sooner or later, discovered. And this reason does, not only, as in

the case above adduced, with regard to the unity of substance, but

where many substances, although all to a certain extent homogeneous,

are discoverable, as in the case of matter in general. Here also

does reason presuppose the existence of the systematic unity of

various powers- inasmuch as particular laws of nature are

subordinate to general laws; and parsimony in principles is not merely

an economical principle of reason, but an essential law of nature.

  We cannot understand, in fact, how a logical principle of unity

can of right exist, unless we presuppose a transcendental principle,

by which such a systematic unit- as a property of objects

themselves- is regarded as necessary a priori. For with what right can

reason, in its logical exercise, require us to regard the variety of

forces which nature displays, as in effect a disguised unity, and to

deduce them from one fundamental force or power, when she is free to

admit that it is just as possible that all forces should be

different in kind, and that a systematic unity is not conformable to

the design of nature? In this view of the case, reason would be

proceeding in direct opposition to her own destination, by setting

as an aim an idea which entirely conflicts with the procedure and

arrangement of nature. Neither can we assert that reason has

previously inferred this unity from the contingent nature of

phenomena. For the law of reason which requires us to seek for this

unity is a necessary law, inasmuch as without it we should not possess

a faculty of reason, nor without reason a consistent and

self-accordant mode of employing the understanding, nor, in the

absence of this, any proper and sufficient criterion of empirical

truth. In relation to this criterion, therefore, we must suppose the

idea of the systematic unity of nature to possess objective validity

and necessity.

  We find this transcendental presupposition lurking in different

forms in the principles of philosophers, although they have neither

recognized it nor confessed to themselves its presence. That the

diversities of individual things do not exclude identity of species,

that the various species must be considered as merely different

determinations of a few genera, and these again as divisions of

still higher races, and so on- that, accordingly, a certain systematic

unity of all possible empirical conceptions, in so far as they can

be deduced from higher and more general conceptions, must be sought

for, is a scholastic maxim or logical principle, without which

reason could not be employed by us. For we can infer the particular

from the general, only in so far as general properties of things

constitute the foundation upon which the particular rest.

  That the same unity exists in nature is presupposed by

philosophers in the well-known scholastic maxim, which forbids us

unnecessarily to augment the number of entities or principles (entia

praeter necessitatem non esse multiplicanda). This maxim asserts

that nature herself assists in the establishment of this unity of

reason, and that the seemingly infinite diversity of phenomena

should not deter us from the expectation of discovering beneath this

diversity a unity of fundamental properties, of which the aforesaid

variety is but a more or less determined form. This unity, although

a mere idea, thinkers have found it necessary rather to moderate the

desire than to encourage it. It was considered a great step when

chemists were able to reduce all salts to two main genera- acids and

alkalis; and they regard this difference as itself a mere variety,

or different manifestation of one and the same fundamental material.

The different kinds of earths (stones and even metals) chemists have

endeavoured to reduce to three, and afterwards to two; but still,

not content with this advance, they cannot but think that behind these

diversities there lurks but one genus- nay, that even salts and earths

have a common principle. It might be conjectured that this is merely

an economical plan of reason, for the purpose of sparing itself

trouble, and an attempt of a purely hypothetical character, which,

when successful, gives an appearance of probability to the principle

of explanation employed by the reason. But a selfish purpose of this

kind is easily to be distinguished from the idea, according to which

every one presupposes that this unity is in accordance with the laws

of nature, and that reason does not in this case request, but

requires, although we are quite unable to determine the proper

limits of this unity.

  If the diversity existing in phenomena- a diversity not of form (for

in this they may be similar) but of content- were so great that the

subtlest human reason could never by comparison discover in them the

least similarity (which is not impossible), in this case the logical

law of genera would be without foundation, the conception of a

genus, nay, all general conceptions would be impossible, and the

faculty of the understanding, the exercise of which is restricted to

the world of conceptions, could not exist. The logical principle of

genera, accordingly, if it is to be applied to nature (by which I mean

objects presented to our senses), presupposes a transcendental

principle. In accordance with this principle, homogeneity is

necessarily presupposed in the variety of phenomena (although we are

unable to determine a priori the degree of this homogeneity),

because without it no empirical conceptions, and consequently no

experience, would be possible.

  The logical principle of genera, which demands identity in

phenomena, is balanced by another principle- that of species, which

requires variety and diversity in things, notwithstanding their

accordance in the same genus, and directs the understanding to

attend to the one no less than to the other. This principle (of the

faculty of distinction) acts as a check upon the reason and reason

exhibits in this respect a double and conflicting interest- on the one

hand, the interest in the extent (the interest of generality) in

relation to genera; on the other, that of the content (the interest of

individuality) in relation to the variety of species. In the former

case, the understanding cogitates more under its conceptions, in the

latter it cogitates more in them. This distinction manifests itself

likewise in the habits of thought peculiar to natural philosophers,

some of whom- the remarkably speculative heads- may be said to be

hostile to heterogeneity in phenomena, and have their eyes always

fixed on the unity of genera, while others- with a strong empirical

tendency- aim unceasingly at the analysis of phenomena, and almost

destroy in us the hope of ever being able to estimate the character of

these according to general principles.

  The latter mode of thought is evidently based upon a logical

principle, the aim of which is the systematic completeness of all

cognitions. This principle authorizes me, beginning at the genus, to

descend to the various and diverse contained under it; and in this way

extension, as in the former case unity, is assured to the system.

For if we merely examine the sphere of the conception which

indicates a genus, we cannot discover how far it is possible to

proceed in the division of that sphere; just as it is impossible, from

the consideration of the space occupied by matter, to determine how

far we can proceed in the division of it. Hence every genus must

contain different species, and these again different subspecies; and

as each of the latter must itself contain a sphere (must be of a

certain extent, as a conceptus communis), reason demands that no

species or sub-species is to be considered as the lowest possible. For

a species or sub-species, being always a conception, which contains

only what is common to a number of different things, does not

completely determine any individual thing, or relate immediately to

it, and must consequently contain other conceptions, that is, other

sub-species under it. This law of specification may be thus expressed:

entium varietates non temere sunt minuendae.

  But it is easy to see that this logical law would likewise be

without sense or application, were it not based upon a

transcendental law of specification, which certainly does not

require that the differences existing phenomena should be infinite

in number, for the logical principle, which merely maintains the

indeterminateness of the logical sphere of a conception, in relation

to its possible division, does not authorize this statement; while

it does impose upon the understanding the duty of searching for

subspecies to every species, and minor differences in every

difference. For, were there no lower conceptions, neither could

there be any higher. Now the understanding cognizes only by means of

conceptions; consequently, how far soever it may proceed in

division, never by mere intuition, but always by lower and lower

conceptions. The cognition of phenomena in their complete

determination (which is possible only by means of the understanding)

requires an unceasingly continued specification of conceptions, and

a progression to ever smaller differences, of which abstraction bad

been made in the conception of the species, and still more in that

of the genus.

  This law of specification cannot be deduced from experience; it

can never present us with a principle of so universal an

application. Empirical specification very soon stops in its

distinction of diversities, and requires the guidance of the

transcendental law, as a principle of the reason- a law which

imposes on us the necessity of never ceasing in our search for

differences, even although these may not present themselves to the

senses. That absorbent earths are of different kinds could only be

discovered by obeying the anticipatory law of reason, which imposes

upon the understanding the task of discovering the differences

existing between these earths, and supposes that nature is richer in

substances than our senses would indicate. The faculty of the

understanding belongs to us just as much under the presupposition of

differences in the objects of nature, as under the condition that

these objects are homogeneous, because we could not possess

conceptions, nor make any use of our understanding, were not the

phenomena included under these conceptions in some respects

dissimilar, as well as similar, in their character.

  Reason thus prepares the sphere of the understanding for the

operations of this faculty: 1. By the principle of the homogeneity

of the diverse in higher genera; 2. By the principle of the variety of

the homogeneous in lower species; and, to complete the systematic

unity, it adds, 3. A law of the affinity of all conceptions which

prescribes a continuous transition from one species to every other

by the gradual increase of diversity. We may term these the principles

of the homogeneity, the specification, and the continuity of forms.

The latter results from the union of the two former, inasmuch as we

regard the systematic connection as complete in thought, in the ascent

to higher genera, as well as in the descent to lower species. For

all diversities must be related to each other, as they all spring from

one highest genus, descending through the different gradations of a

more and more extended determination.

  We may illustrate the systematic unity produced by the three logical

principles in the following manner. Every conception may be regarded

as a point, which, as the standpoint of a spectator, has a certain

horizon, which may be said to enclose a number of things that may be

viewed, so to speak, from that centre. Within this horizon there

must be an infinite number of other points, each of which has its

own horizon, smaller and more circumscribed; in other words, every

species contains sub-species, according to the principle of

specification, and the logical horizon consists of smaller horizons

(subspecies), but not of points (individuals), which possess no

extent. But different horizons or genera, which include under them

so many conceptions, may have one common horizon, from which, as

from a mid-point, they may be surveyed; and we may proceed thus,

till we arrive at the highest genus, or universal and true horizon,

which is determined by the highest conception, and which contains

under itself all differences and varieties, as genera, species, and

subspecies.

  To this highest standpoint I am conducted by the law of homogeneity,

as to all lower and more variously-determined conceptions by the law

of specification. Now as in this way there exists no void in the whole

extent of all possible conceptions, and as out of the sphere of

these the mind can discover nothing, there arises from the

presupposition of the universal horizon above mentioned, and its

complete division, the principle: Non datur vacuum formarum. This

principle asserts that there are not different primitive and highest

genera, which stand isolated, so to speak, from each other, but all

the various genera are mere divisions and limitations of one highest

and universal genus; and hence follows immediately the principle:

Datur continuum formarum. This principle indicates that all

differences of species limit each other, and do not admit of

transition from one to another by a saltus, but only through smaller

degrees of the difference between the one species and the other. In

one word, there are no species or sub-species which (in the view of

reason) are the nearest possible to each other; intermediate species

or sub-species being always possible, the difference of which from

each of the former is always smaller than the difference existing

between these.

  The first law, therefore, directs us to avoid the notion that

there exist different primal genera, and enounces the fact of

perfect homogeneity; the second imposes a check upon this tendency

to unity and prescribes the distinction of sub-species, before

proceeding to apply our general conceptions to individuals. The

third unites both the former, by enouncing the fact of homogeneity

as existing even in the most various diversity, by means of the

gradual transition from one species to another. Thus it indicates a

relationship between the different branches or species, in so far as

they all spring from the same stem.

  But this logical law of the continuum specierum (formarum logicarum)

presupposes a transcendental principle (lex continui in natura),

without which the understanding might be led into error, by

following the guidance of the former, and thus perhaps pursuing a path

contrary to that prescribed by nature. This law must, consequently, be

based upon pure transcendental, and not upon empirical,

considerations. For, in the latter case, it would come later than

the system; whereas it is really itself the parent of all that is

systematic in our cognition of nature. These principles are not mere

hypotheses employed for the purpose of experimenting upon nature;

although when any such connection is discovered, it forms a solid

ground for regarding the hypothetical unity as valid in the sphere

of nature- and thus they are in this respect not without their use.

But we go farther, and maintain that it is manifest that these

principles of parsimony in fundamental causes, variety in effects, and

affinity in phenomena, are in accordance both with reason and

nature, and that they are not mere methods or plans devised for the

purpose of assisting us in our observation of the external world.

  But it is plain that this continuity of forms is a mere idea, to

which no adequate object can be discovered in experience. And this for

two reasons. First, because the species in nature are really

divided, and hence form quanta discreta; and, if the gradual

progression through their affinity were continuous, the intermediate

members lying between two given species must be infinite in number,

which is impossible. Secondly, because we cannot make any

determinate empirical use of this law, inasmuch as it does not present

us with any criterion of affinity which could aid us in determining

how far we ought to pursue the graduation of differences: it merely

contains a general indication that it is our duty to seek for and,

if possible, to discover them.

  When we arrange these principles of systematic unity in the order

conformable to their employment in experience, they will stand thus:

Variety, Affinity, Unity, each of them, as ideas, being taken in the

highest degree of their completeness. Reason presupposes the existence

of cognitions of the understanding, which have a direct relation to

experience, and aims at the ideal unity of these cognitions- a unity

which far transcends all experience or empirical notions. The affinity

of the diverse, notwithstanding the differences existing between its

parts, has a relation to things, but a still closer one to the mere

properties and powers of things. For example, imperfect experience may

represent the orbits of the planets as circular. But we discover

variations from this course, and we proceed to suppose that the

planets revolve in a path which, if not a circle, is of a character

very similar to it. That is to say, the movements of those planets

which do not form a circle will approximate more or less to the

properties of a circle, and probably form an ellipse. The paths of

comets exhibit still greater variations, for, so far as our

observation extends, they do not return upon their own course in a

circle or ellipse. But we proceed to the conjecture that comets

describe a parabola, a figure which is closely allied to the

ellipse. In fact, a parabola is merely an ellipse, with its longer

axis produced to an indefinite extent. Thus these principles conduct

us to a unity in the genera of the forms of these orbits, and,

proceeding farther, to a unity as regards the cause of the motions

of the heavenly bodies- that is, gravitation. But we go on extending

our conquests over nature, and endeavour to explain all seeming

deviations from these rules, and even make additions to our system

which no experience can ever substantiate- for example, the theory, in

affinity with that of ellipses, of hyperbolic paths of comets,

pursuing which, these bodies leave our solar system and, passing

from sun to sun, unite the most distant parts of the infinite

universe, which is held together by the same moving power.

  The most remarkable circumstance connected with these principles

is that they seem to be transcendental, and, although only

containing ideas for the guidance of the empirical exercise of reason,

and although this empirical employment stands to these ideas in an

asymptotic relation alone (to use a mathematical term), that is,

continually approximate, without ever being able to attain to them,

they possess, notwithstanding, as a priori synthetical propositions,

objective though undetermined validity, and are available as rules for

possible experience. In the elaboration of our experience, they may

also be employed with great advantage, as heuristic* principles. A

transcendental deduction of them cannot be made; such a deduction

being always impossible in the case of ideas, as has been already

shown.



  *From the Greek, eurhioko.



  We distinguished, in the Transcendental Analytic, the dynamical

principles of the understanding, which are regulative principles of

intuition, from the mathematical, which are constitutive principles of

intuition. These dynamical laws are, however, constitutive in relation

to experience, inasmuch as they render the conceptions without which

experience could not exist possible a priori. But the principles of

pure reason cannot be constitutive even in regard to empirical

conceptions, because no sensuous schema corresponding to them can be

discovered, and they cannot therefore have an object in concreto. Now,

if I grant that they cannot be employed in the sphere of experience,

as constitutive principles, how shall I secure for them employment and

objective validity as regulative principles, and in what way can

they be so employed?

  The understanding is the object of reason, as sensibility is the

object of the understanding. The production of systematic unity in all

the empirical operations of the understanding is the proper occupation

of reason; just as it is the business of the understanding to

connect the various content of phenomena by means of conceptions,

and subject them to empirical laws. But the operations of the

understanding are, without the schemata of sensibility,

undetermined; and, in the same manner, the unity of reason is

perfectly undetermined as regards the conditions under which, and

the extent to which, the understanding ought to carry the systematic

connection of its conceptions. But, although it is impossible to

discover in intuition a schema for the complete systematic unity of

all the conceptions of the understanding, there must be some

analogon of this schema. This analogon is the idea of the maximum of

the division and the connection of our cognition in one principle. For

we may have a determinate notion of a maximum and an absolutely

perfect, all the restrictive conditions which are connected with an

indeterminate and various content having been abstracted. Thus the

idea of reason is analogous with a sensuous schema, with this

difference, that the application of the categories to the schema of

reason does not present a cognition of any object (as is the case with

the application of the categories to sensuous schemata), but merely

provides us with a rule or principle for the systematic unity of the

exercise of the understanding. Now, as every principle which imposes

upon the exercise of the understanding a priori compliance with the

rule of systematic unity also relates, although only in an indirect

manner, to an object of experience, the principles of pure reason will

also possess objective reality and validity in relation to experience.

But they will not aim at determining our knowledge in regard to any

empirical object; they will merely indicate the procedure, following

which the empirical and determinate exercise of the understanding

may be in complete harmony and connection with itself- a result

which is produced by its being brought into harmony with the principle

of systematic unity, so far as that is possible, and deduced from it.

  I term all subjective principles, which are not derived from

observation of the constitution of an object, but from the interest

which Reason has in producing a certain completeness in her

cognition of that object, maxims of reason. Thus there are maxims of

speculative reason, which are based solely upon its speculative

interest, although they appear to be objective principles.

  When principles which are really regulative are regarded as

constitutive, and employed as objective principles, contradictions

must arise; but if they are considered as mere maxims, there is no

room for contradictions of any kind, as they then merely indicate

the different interests of reason, which occasion differences in the

mode of thought. In effect, Reason has only one single interest, and

the seeming contradiction existing between her maxims merely indicates

a difference in, and a reciprocal limitation of, the methods by

which this interest is satisfied.

  This reasoner has at heart the interest of diversity- in

accordance with the principle of specification; another, the

interest of unity- in accordance with the principle of aggregation.

Each believes that his judgement rests upon a thorough insight into

the subject he is examining, and yet it has been influenced solely

by a greater or less degree of adherence to some one of the two

principles, neither of which are objective, but originate solely

from the interest of reason, and on this account to be termed maxims

rather than principles. When I observe intelligent men disputing about

the distinctive characteristics of men, animals, or plants, and even

of minerals, those on the one side assuming the existence of certain

national characteristics, certain well-defined and hereditary

distinctions of family, race, and so on, while the other side maintain

that nature has endowed all races of men with the same faculties and

dispositions, and that all differences are but the result of

external and accidental circumstances- I have only to consider for a

moment the real nature of the subject of discussion, to arrive at

the conclusion that it is a subject far too deep for us to judge of,

and that there is little probability of either party being able to

speak from a perfect insight into and understanding of the nature of

the subject itself. Both have, in reality, been struggling for the

twofold interest of reason; the one maintaining the one interest,

the other the other. But this difference between the maxims of

diversity and unity may easily be reconciled and adjusted; although,

so long as they are regarded as objective principles, they must

occasion not only contradictions and polemic, but place hinderances in

the way of the advancement of truth, until some means is discovered of

reconciling these conflicting interests, and bringing reason into

union and harmony with itself.

  The same is the case with the so-called law discovered by

Leibnitz, and supported with remarkable ability by Bonnet- the law

of the continuous gradation of created beings, which is nothing more

than an inference from the principle of affinity; for observation

and study of the order of nature could never present it to the mind as

an objective truth. The steps of this ladder, as they appear in

experience, are too far apart from each other, and the so-called petty

differences between different kinds of animals are in nature

commonly so wide separations that no confidence can be placed in

such views (particularly when we reflect on the great variety of

things, and the ease with which we can discover resemblances), and

no faith in the laws which are said to express the aims and purposes

of nature. On the other hand, the method of investigating the order of

nature in the light of this principle, and the maxim which requires us

to regard this order- it being still undetermined how far it

extends- as really existing in nature, is beyond doubt a legitimate

and excellent principle of reason- a principle which extends farther

than any experience or observation of ours and which, without giving

us any positive knowledge of anything in the region of experience,

guides us to the goal of systematic unity.



  Of the Ultimate End of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reason.



  The ideas of pure reason cannot be, of themselves and in their own

nature, dialectical; it is from their misemployment alone that

fallacies and illusions arise. For they originate in the nature of

reason itself, and it is impossible that this supreme tribunal for all

the rights and claims of speculation should be itself undeserving of

confidence and promotive of error. It is to be expected, therefore,

that these ideas have a genuine and legitimate aim. It is true, the

mob of sophists raise against reason the cry of inconsistency and

contradiction, and affect to despise the government of that faculty,

because they cannot understand its constitution, while it is to its

beneficial influences alone that they owe the position and the

intelligence which enable them to criticize and to blame its

procedure.

  We cannot employ an a priori conception with certainty, until we

have made a transcendental deduction therefore. The ideas of pure

reason do not admit of the same kind of deduction as the categories.

But if they are to possess the least objective validity, and to

represent anything but mere creations of thought (entia rationis

ratiocinantis), a deduction of them must be possible. This deduction

will complete the critical task imposed upon pure reason; and it is to

this part Of our labours that we now proceed.

  There is a great difference between a thing's being presented to the

mind as an object in an absolute sense, or merely as an ideal

object. In the former case I employ my conceptions to determine the

object; in the latter case nothing is present to the mind but a mere

schema, which does not relate directly to an object, not even in a

hypothetical sense, but which is useful only for the purpose of

representing other objects to the mind, in a mediate and indirect

manner, by means of their relation to the idea in the intellect.

Thus I say the conception of a supreme intelligence is a mere idea;

that is to say, its objective reality does not consist in the fact

that it has an immediate relation to an object (for in this sense we

have no means of establishing its objective validity), it is merely

a schema constructed according to the necessary conditions of the

unity of reason- the schema of a thing in general, which is useful

towards the production of the highest degree of systematic unity in

the empirical exercise of reason, in which we deduce this or that

object of experience from the imaginary object of this idea, as the

ground or cause of the said object of experience. In this way, the

idea is properly a heuristic, and not an ostensive, conception; it

does not give us any information respecting the constitution of an

object, it merely indicates how, under the guidance of the idea, we

ought to investigate the constitution and the relations of objects

in the world of experience. Now, if it can be shown that the three

kinds of transcendental ideas (psychological, cosmological, and

theological), although not relating directly to any object nor

determining it, do nevertheless, on the supposition of the existence

of an ideal object, produce systematic unity in the laws of the

empirical employment of the reason, and extend our empirical

cognition, without ever being inconsistent or in opposition with it-

it must be a necessary maxim of reason to regulate its procedure

according to these ideas. And this forms the transcendental

deduction of all speculative ideas, not as constitutive principles

of the extension of our cognition beyond the limits of our experience,

but as regulative principles of the systematic unity of empirical

cognition, which is by the aid of these ideas arranged and emended

within its own proper limits, to an extent unattainable by the

operation of the principles of the understanding alone.

  I shall make this plainer. Guided by the principles involved in

these ideas, we must, in the first place, so connect all the

phenomena, actions, and feelings of the mind, as if it were a simple

substance, which, endowed with personal identity, possesses a

permanent existence (in this life at least), while its states, among

which those of the body are to be included as external conditions, are

in continual change. Secondly, in cosmology, we must investigate the

conditions of all natural phenomena, internal as well as external,

as if they belonged to a chain infinite and without any prime or

supreme member, while we do not, on this account, deny the existence

of intelligible grounds of these phenomena, although we never employ

them to explain phenomena, for the simple reason that they are not

objects of our cognition. Thirdly, in the sphere of theology, we

must regard the whole system of possible experience as forming an

absolute, but dependent and sensuously-conditioned unity, and at the

same time as based upon a sole, supreme, and all-sufficient ground

existing apart from the world itself- a ground which is a

self-subsistent, primeval and creative reason, in relation to which we

so employ our reason in the field of experience, as if all objects

drew their origin from that archetype of all reason. In other words,

we ought not to deduce the internal phenomena of the mind from a

simple thinking substance, but deduce them from each other under the

guidance of the regulative idea of a simple being; we ought not to

deduce the phenomena, order, and unity of the universe from a

supreme intelligence, but merely draw from this idea of a supremely

wise cause the rules which must guide reason in its connection of

causes and effects.

  Now there is nothing to hinder us from admitting these ideas to

possess an objective and hyperbolic existence, except the cosmological

ideas, which lead reason into an antinomy: the psychological and

theological ideas are not antinomial. They contain no contradiction;

and how, then, can any one dispute their objective reality, since he

who denies it knows as little about their possibility as we who

affirm? And yet, when we wish to admit the existence of a thing, it is

not sufficient to convince ourselves that there is no positive

obstacle in the way; for it cannot be allowable to regard mere

creations of thought, which transcend, though they do not

contradict, all our conceptions, as real and determinate objects,

solely upon the authority of a speculative reason striving to

compass its own aims. They cannot, therefore, be admitted to be real

in themselves; they can only possess a comparative reality- that of

a schema of the regulative principle of the systematic unity of all

cognition. They are to be regarded not as actual things, but as in

some measure analogous to them. We abstract from the object of the

idea all the conditions which limit the exercise of our understanding,

but which, on the other hand, are the sole conditions of our

possessing a determinate conception of any given thing. And thus we

cogitate a something, of the real nature of which we have not the

least conception, but which we represent to ourselves as standing in a

relation to the whole system of phenomena, analogous to that in

which phenomena stand to each other.

  By admitting these ideal beings, we do not really extend our

cognitions beyond the objects of possible experience; we extend merely

the empirical unity of our experience, by the aid of systematic unity,

the schema of which is furnished by the idea, which is therefore

valid- not as a constitutive, but as a regulative principle. For

although we posit a thing corresponding to the idea- a something, an

actual existence- we do not on that account aim at the extension of

our cognition by means of transcendent conceptions. This existence

is purely ideal, and not objective; it is the mere expression of the

systematic unity which is to be the guide of reason in the field of

experience. There are no attempts made at deciding what the ground

of this unity may be, or what the real nature of this imaginary being.

  Thus the transcendental and only determinate conception of God,

which is presented to us by speculative reason, is in the strictest

sense deistic. In other words, reason does not assure us of the

objective validity of the conception; it merely gives us the idea of

something, on which the supreme and necessary unity of all

experience is based. This something we cannot, following the analogy

of a real substance, cogitate otherwise than as the cause of all

things operating in accordance with rational laws, if we regard it

as an individual object; although we should rest contented with the

idea alone as a regulative principle of reason, and make no attempt at

completing the sum of the conditions imposed by thought. This

attempt is, indeed, inconsistent with the grand aim of complete

systematic unity in the sphere of cognition- a unity to which no

bounds are set by reason.

  Hence it happens that, admitting a divine being, I can have no

conception of the internal possibility of its perfection, or of the

necessity of its existence. The only advantage of this admission is

that it enables me to answer all other questions relating to the

contingent, and to give reason the most complete satisfaction as

regards the unity which it aims at attaining in the world of

experience. But I cannot satisfy reason with regard to this hypothesis

itself; and this proves that it is not its intelligence and insight

into the subject, but its speculative interest alone which induces

it to proceed from a point lying far beyond the sphere of our

cognition, for the purpose of being able to consider all objects as

parts of a systematic whole.

  Here a distinction presents itself, in regard to the way in which we

may cogitate a presupposition- a distinction which is somewhat subtle,

but of great importance in transcendental philosophy. I may have

sufficient grounds to admit something, or the existence of

something, in a relative point of view (suppositio relativa),

without being justified in admitting it in an absolute sense

(suppositio absoluta). This distinction is undoubtedly requisite, in

the case of a regulative principle, the necessity of which we

recognize, though we are ignorant of the source and cause of that

necessity, and which we assume to be based upon some ultimate

ground, for the purpose of being able to cogitate the universality

of the principle in a more determinate way. For example, I cogitate

the existence of a being corresponding to a pure transcendental

idea. But I cannot admit that this being exists absolutely and in

itself, because all of the conceptions by which I can cogitate an

object in a determinate manner fall short of assuring me of its

existence; nay, the conditions of the objective validity of my

conceptions are excluded by the idea- by the very fact of its being an

idea. The conceptions of reality, substance, causality, nay, even that

of necessity in existence, have no significance out of the sphere of

empirical cognition, and cannot, beyond that sphere, determine any

object. They may, accordingly, be employed to explain the

possibility of things in the world of sense, but they are utterly

inadequate to explain the possibility of the universe itself

considered as a whole; because in this case the ground of

explanation must lie out of and beyond the world, and cannot,

therefore, be an object of possible experience. Now, I may admit the

existence of an incomprehensible being of this nature- the object of a

mere idea, relatively to the world of sense; although I have no ground

to admit its existence absolutely and in itself. For if an idea

(that of a systematic and complete unity, of which I shall presently

speak more particularly) lies at the foundation of the most extended

empirical employment of reason, and if this idea cannot be

adequately represented in concreto, although it is indispensably

necessary for the approximation of empirical unity to the highest

possible degree- I am not only authorized, but compelled, to realize

this idea, that is, to posit a real object corresponding thereto.

But I cannot profess to know this object; it is to me merely a

something, to which, as the ground of systematic unity in cognition, I

attribute such properties as are analogous to the conceptions employed

by the understanding in the sphere of experience. Following the

analogy of the notions of reality, substance, causality, and

necessity, I cogitate a being, which possesses all these attributes in

the highest degree; and, as this idea is the offspring of my reason

alone, I cogitate this being as self-subsistent reason, and as the

cause of the universe operating by means of ideas of the greatest

possible harmony and unity. Thus I abstract all conditions that

would limit my idea, solely for the purpose of rendering systematic

unity possible in the world of empirical diversity, and thus

securing the widest possible extension for the exercise of reason in

that sphere. This I am enabled to do, by regarding all connections and

relations in the world of sense, as if they were the dispositions of a

supreme reason, of which our reason is but a faint image. I then

proceed to cogitate this Supreme Being by conceptions which have,

properly, no meaning or application, except in the world of sense. But

as I am authorized to employ the transcendental hypothesis of such a

being in a relative respect alone, that is, as the substratum of the

greatest possible unity in experience- I may attribute to a being

which I regard as distinct from the world, such properties as belong

solely to the sphere of sense and experience. For I do not desire, and

am not justified in desiring, to cognize this object of my idea, as it

exists in itself; for I possess no conceptions sufficient for or task,

those of reality, substance, causality, nay, even that of necessity in

existence, losing all significance, and becoming merely the signs of

conceptions, without content and without applicability, when I attempt

to carry them beyond the limits of the world of sense. I cogitate

merely the relation of a perfectly unknown being to the greatest

possible systematic unity of experience, solely for the purpose of

employing it as the schema of the regulative principle which directs

reason in its empirical exercise.

  It is evident, at the first view, that we cannot presuppose the

reality of this transcendental object, by means of the conceptions

of reality, substance, causality, and so on, because these conceptions

cannot be applied to anything that is distinct from the world of

sense. Thus the supposition of a Supreme Being or cause is purely

relative; it is cogitated only in behalf of the systematic unity of

experience; such a being is but a something, of whose existence in

itself we have not the least conception. Thus, too, it becomes

sufficiently manifest why we required the idea of a necessary being in

relation to objects given by sense, although we can never have the

least conception of this being, or of its absolute necessity.

  And now we can clearly perceive the result of our transcendental

dialectic, and the proper aim of the ideas of pure reason- which

become dialectical solely from misunderstanding and inconsiderateness.

Pure reason is, in fact, occupied with itself, and not with any

object. Objects are not presented to it to be embraced in the unity of

an empirical conception; it is only the cognitions of the

understanding that are presented to it, for the purpose of receiving

the unity of a rational conception, that is, of being connected

according to a principle. The unity of reason is the unity of

system; and this systematic unity is not an objective principle,

extending its dominion over objects, but a subjective maxim, extending

its authority over the empirical cognition of objects. The

systematic connection which reason gives to the empirical employment

of the understanding not only advances the extension of that

employment, but ensures its correctness, and thus the principle of a

systematic unity of this nature is also objective, although only in an

indefinite respect (principium vagum). It is not, however, a

constitutive principle, determining an object to which it directly

relates; it is merely a regulative principle or maxim, advancing and

strengthening the empirical exercise of reason, by the opening up of

new paths of which the understanding is ignorant, while it never

conflicts with the laws of its exercise in the sphere of experience.

  But reason cannot cogitate this systematic unity, without at the

same time cogitating an object of the idea- an object that cannot be

presented in any experience, which contains no concrete example of a

complete systematic unity. This being (ens rationis ratiocinatae) is

therefore a mere idea and is not assumed to be a thing which is real

absolutely and in itself. On the contrary, it forms merely the

problematical foundation of the connection which the mind introduces

among the phenomena of the sensuous world. We look upon this

connection, in the light of the above-mentioned idea, as if it drew

its origin from the supposed being which corresponds to the idea.

And yet all we aim at is the possession of this idea as a secure

foundation for the systematic unity of experience- a unity

indispensable to reason, advantageous to the understanding, and

promotive of the interests of empirical cognition.

  We mistake the true meaning of this idea when we regard it as an

enouncement, or even as a hypothetical declaration of the existence of

a real thing, which we are to regard as the origin or ground of a

systematic constitution of the universe. On the contrary, it is left

completely undetermined what the nature or properties of this

so-called ground may be. The idea is merely to be adopted as a point

of view, from which this unity, so essential to reason and so

beneficial to the understanding, may be regarded as radiating. In

one word, this transcendental thing is merely the schema of a

regulative principle, by means of which Reason, so far as in her lies,

extends the dominion of systematic unity over the whole sphere of

experience.

  The first object of an idea of this kind is the ego, considered

merely as a thinking nature or soul. If I wish to investigate the

properties of a thinking being, I must interrogate experience. But I

find that I can apply none of the categories to this object, the

schema of these categories, which is the condition of their

application, being given only in sensuous intuition. But I cannot thus

attain to the cognition of a systematic unity of all the phenomena

of the internal sense. Instead, therefore, of an empirical

conception of what the soul really is, reason takes the conception

of the empirical unity of all thought, and, by cogitating this unity

as unconditioned and primitive, constructs the rational conception

or idea of a simple substance which is in itself unchangeable,

possessing personal identity, and in connection with other real things

external to it; in one word, it constructs the idea of a simple

self-subsistent intelligence. But the real aim of reason in this

procedure is the attainment of principles of systematic unity for

the explanation of the phenomena of the soul. That is, reason

desires to be able to represent all the determinations of the internal

sense as existing in one subject, all powers as deduced from one

fundamental power, all changes as mere varieties in the condition of a

being which is permanent and always the same, and all phenomena in

space as entirely different in their nature from the procedure of

thought. Essential simplicity (with the other attributes predicated of

the ego) is regarded as the mere schema of this regulative

principle; it is not assumed that it is the actual ground of the

properties of the soul. For these properties may rest upon quite

different grounds, of which we are completely ignorant; just as the

above predicates could not give us any knowledge of the soul as it

is in itself, even if we regarded them as valid in respect of it,

inasmuch as they constitute a mere idea, which cannot be represented

in concreto. Nothing but good can result from a psychological idea

of this kind, if we only take proper care not to consider it as more

than an idea; that is, if we regard it as valid merely in relation

to the employment of reason, in the sphere of the phenomena of the

soul. Under the guidance of this idea, or principle, no empirical laws

of corporeal phenomena are called in to explain that which is a

phenomenon of the internal sense alone; no windy hypotheses of the

generation, annihilation, and palingenesis of souls are admitted. Thus

the consideration of this object of the internal sense is kept pure,

and unmixed with heterogeneous elements; while the investigation of

reason aims at reducing all the grounds of explanation employed in

this sphere of knowledge to a single principle. All this is best

effected, nay, cannot be effected otherwise than by means of such a

schema, which requires us to regard this ideal thing as an actual

existence. The psychological idea is, therefore, meaningless and

inapplicable, except as the schema of a regulative conception. For, if

I ask whether the soul is not really of a spiritual nature- it is a

question which has no meaning. From such a conception has been

abstracted, not merely all corporeal nature, but all nature, that

is, all the predicates of a possible experience; and consequently, all

the conditions which enable us to cogitate an object to this

conception have disappeared. But, if these conditions are absent, it

is evident that the conception is meaningless.

  The second regulative idea of speculative reason is the conception

of the universe. For nature is properly the only object presented to

us, in regard to which reason requires regulative principles. Nature

is twofold- thinking and corporeal nature. To cogitate the latter in

regard to its internal possibility, that is, to determine the

application of the categories to it, no idea is required- no

representation which transcends experience. In this sphere, therefore,

an idea is impossible, sensuous intuition being our only guide; while,

in the sphere of psychology, we require the fundamental idea (I),

which contains a priori a certain form of thought namely, the unity of

the ego. Pure reason has, therefore, nothing left but nature in

general, and the completeness of conditions in nature in accordance

with some principle. The absolute totality of the series of these

conditions is an idea, which can never be fully realized in the

empirical exercise of reason, while it is serviceable as a rule for

the procedure of reason in relation to that totality. It requires

us, in the explanation of given phenomena (in the regress or ascent in

the series), to proceed as if the series were infinite in itself, that

is, were prolonged in indefinitum,; while on the other hand, where

reason is regarded as itself the determining cause (in the region of

freedom), we are required to proceed as if we had not before us an

object of sense, but of the pure understanding. In this latter case,

the conditions do not exist in the series of phenomena, but may be

placed quite out of and beyond it, and the series of conditions may be

regarded as if it had an absolute beginning from an intelligible

cause. All this proves that the cosmological ideas are nothing but

regulative principles, and not constitutive; and that their aim is not

to realize an actual totality in such series. The full discussion of

this subject will be found in its proper place in the chapter on the

antinomy of pure reason.

  The third idea of pure reason, containing the hypothesis of a

being which is valid merely as a relative hypothesis, is that of the

one and all-sufficient cause of all cosmological series, in other

words, the idea of God. We have not the slightest ground absolutely to

admit the existence of an object corresponding to this idea; for

what can empower or authorize us to affirm the existence of a being of

the highest perfection- a being whose existence is absolutely

necessary- merely because we possess the conception of such a being?

The answer is: It is the existence of the world which renders this

hypothesis necessary. But this answer makes it perfectly evident

that the idea of this being, like all other speculative ideas, is

essentially nothing more than a demand upon reason that it shall

regulate the connection which it and its subordinate faculties

introduce into the phenomena of the world by principles of

systematic unity and, consequently, that it shall regard all phenomena

as originating from one all-embracing being, as the supreme and

all-sufficient cause. From this it is plain that the only aim of

reason in this procedure is the establishment of its own formal rule

for the extension of its dominion in the world of experience; that

it does not aim at an extension of its cognition beyond the limits

of experience; and that, consequently, this idea does not contain

any constitutive principle.

  The highest formal unity, which is based upon ideas alone, is the

unity of all things- a unity in accordance with an aim or purpose; and

the speculative interest of reason renders it necessary to regard

all order in the world as if it originated from the intention and

design of a supreme reason. This principle unfolds to the view of

reason in the sphere of experience new and enlarged prospects, and

invites it to connect the phenomena of the world according to

teleological laws, and in this way to attain to the highest possible

degree of systematic unity. The hypothesis of a supreme

intelligence, as the sole cause of the universe- an intelligence which

has for us no more than an ideal existence- is accordingly always of

the greatest service to reason. Thus, if we presuppose, in relation to

the figure of the earth (which is round, but somewhat flattened at the

poles),* or that of mountains or seas, wise designs on the part of

an author of the universe, we cannot fail to make, by the light of

this supposition, a great number of interesting discoveries. If we

keep to this hypothesis, as a principle which is purely regulative,

even error cannot be very detrimental. For, in this case, error can

have no more serious consequences than that, where we expected to

discover a teleological connection (nexus finalis), only a

mechanical or physical connection appears. In such a case, we merely

fail to find the additional form of unity we expected, but we do not

lose the rational unity which the mind requires in its procedure in

experience. But even a miscarriage of this sort cannot affect the

law in its general and teleological relations. For although we may

convict an anatomist of an error, when he connects the limb of some

animal with a certain purpose, it is quite impossible to prove in a

single case that any arrangement of nature, be it what it may, is

entirely without aim or design. And thus medical physiology, by the

aid of a principle presented to it by pure reason, extends its very

limited empirical knowledge of the purposes of the different parts

of an organized body so far that it may be asserted with the utmost

confidence, and with the approbation of all reflecting men, that every

organ or bodily part of an animal has its use and answers a certain

design. Now, this is a supposition which, if regarded as of a

constitutive character, goes much farther than any experience or

observation of ours can justify. Hence it is evident that it is

nothing more than a regulative principle of reason, which aims at

the highest degree of systematic unity, by the aid of the idea of a

causality according to design in a supreme cause- a cause which it

regards as the highest intelligence.



  *The advantages which a circular form, in the case of the earth, has

over every other, are well known. But few are aware that the slight

flattening at the poles, which gives it the figure of a spheroid, is

the only cause which prevents the elevations of continents or even

of mountains, perhaps thrown up by some internal convulsion, from

continually altering the position of the axis of the earth- and that

to some considerable degree in a short time. The great protuberance of

the earth under the Equator serves to overbalance the impetus of all

other masses of earth, and thus to preserve the axis of the earth,

so far as we can observe, in its present position. And yet this wise

arrangement has been unthinkingly explained from the equilibrium of

the formerly fluid mass.



  If, however, we neglect this restriction of the idea to a purely

regulative influence, reason is betrayed into numerous errors. For

it has then left the ground of experience, in which alone are to be

found the criteria of truth, and has ventured into the region of the

incomprehensible and unsearchable, on the heights of which it loses

its power and collectedness, because it has completely severed its

connection with experience.

  The first error which arises from our employing the idea of a

Supreme Being as a constitutive (in repugnance to the very nature of

an idea), and not as a regulative principle, is the error of

inactive reason (ignava ratio).* We may so term every principle

which requires us to regard our investigations of nature as absolutely

complete, and allows reason to cease its inquiries, as if it had fully

executed its task. Thus the psychological idea of the ego, when

employed as a constitutive principle for the explanation of the

phenomena of the soul, and for the extension of our knowledge

regarding this subject beyond the limits of experience- even to the

condition of the soul after death- is convenient enough for the

purposes of pure reason, but detrimental and even ruinous to its

interests in the sphere of nature and experience. The dogmatizing

spiritualist explains the unchanging unity of our personality

through all changes of condition from the unity of a thinking

substance, the interest which we take in things and events that can

happen only after our death, from a consciousness of the immaterial

nature of our thinking subject, and so on. Thus he dispenses with

all empirical investigations into the cause of these internal

phenomena, and with all possible explanations of them upon purely

natural grounds; while, at the dictation of a transcendent reason,

he passes by the immanent sources of cognition in experience,

greatly to his own ease and convenience, but to the sacrifice of

all, genuine insight and intelligence. These prejudicial

consequences become still more evident, in the case of the

dogmatical treatment of our idea of a Supreme Intelligence, and the

theological system of nature (physico-theology) which is falsely based

upon it. For, in this case, the aims which we observe in nature, and

often those which we merely fancy to exist, make the investigation

of causes a very easy task, by directing us to refer such and such

phenomena immediately to the unsearchable will and counsel of the

Supreme Wisdom, while we ought to investigate their causes in the

general laws of the mechanism of matter. We are thus recommended to

consider the labour of reason as ended, when we have merely

dispensed with its employment, which is guided surely and safely

only by the order of nature and the series of changes in the world-

which are arranged according to immanent and general laws. This

error may be avoided, if we do not merely consider from the view-point

of final aims certain parts of nature, such as the division and

structure of a continent, the constitution and direction of certain

mountain-chains, or even the organization existing in the vegetable

and animal kingdoms, but look upon this systematic unity of nature

in a perfectly general way, in relation to the idea of a Supreme

Intelligence. If we pursue this advice, we lay as a foundation for all

investigation the conformity to aims of all phenomena of nature in

accordance with universal laws, for which no particular arrangement of

nature is exempt, but only cognized by us with more or less

difficulty; and we possess a regulative principle of the systematic

unity of a teleological connection, which we do not attempt to

anticipate or predetermine. All that we do, and ought to do, is to

follow out the physico-mechanical connection in nature according to

general laws, with the hope of discovering, sooner or later, the

teleological connection also. Thus, and thus only, can the principle

of final unity aid in the extension of the employment of reason in the

sphere of experience, without being in any case detrimental to its

interests.



  *This was the term applied by the old dialecticians to a sophistical

argument, which ran thus: If it is your fate to die of this disease,

you will die, whether you employ a physician or not. Cicero says

that this mode of reasoning has received this appellation, because, if

followed, it puts an end to the employment of reason in the affairs of

life. For a similar reason, I have applied this designation to the

sophistical argument of pure reason.



  The second error which arises from the misconception of the

principle of systematic unity is that of perverted reason (perversa

ratio, usteron roteron rationis). The idea of systematic unity is

available as a regulative principle in the connection of phenomena

according to general natural laws; and, how far soever we have to

travel upon the path of experience to discover some fact or event,

this idea requires us to believe that we have approached all the

more nearly to the completion of its use in the sphere of nature,

although that completion can never be attained. But this error

reverses the procedure of reason. We begin by hypostatizing the

principle of systematic unity, and by giving an anthropomorphic

determination to the conception of a Supreme Intelligence, and then

proceed forcibly to impose aims upon nature. Thus not only does

teleology, which ought to aid in the completion of unity in accordance

with general laws, operate to the destruction of its influence, but it

hinders reason from attaining its proper aim, that is, the proof, upon

natural grounds, of the existence of a supreme intelligent cause. For,

if we cannot presuppose supreme finality in nature a priori, that

is, as essentially belonging to nature, how can we be directed to

endeavour to discover this unity and, rising gradually through its

different degrees, to approach the supreme perfection of an author

of all- a perfection which is absolutely necessary, and therefore

cognizable a priori? The regulative principle directs us to presuppose

systematic unity absolutely and, consequently, as following from the

essential nature of things- but only as a unity of nature, not

merely cognized empirically, but presupposed a priori, although only

in an indeterminate manner. But if I insist on basing nature upon

the foundation of a supreme ordaining Being, the unity of nature is in

effect lost. For, in this case, it is quite foreign and unessential to

the nature of things, and cannot be cognized from the general laws

of nature. And thus arises a vicious circular argument, what ought

to have been proved having been presupposed.

  To take the regulative principle of systematic unity in nature for a

constitutive principle, and to hypostatize and make a cause out of

that which is properly the ideal ground of the consistent and

harmonious exercise of reason, involves reason in inextricable

embarrassments. The investigation of nature pursues its own path under

the guidance of the chain of natural causes, in accordance with the

general laws of nature, and ever follows the light of the idea of an

author of the universe- not for the purpose of deducing the

finality, which it constantly pursues, from this Supreme Being, but to

attain to the cognition of his existence from the finality which it

seeks in the existence of the phenomena of nature, and, if possible,

in that of all things to cognize this being, consequently, as

absolutely necessary. Whether this latter purpose succeed or not,

the idea is and must always be a true one, and its employment, when

merely regulative, must always be accompanied by truthful and

beneficial results.

  Complete unity, in conformity with aims, constitutes absolute

perfection. But if we do not find this unity in the nature of the

things which go to constitute the world of experience, that is, of

objective cognition, consequently in the universal and necessary

laws of nature, how can we infer from this unity the idea of the

supreme and absolutely necessary perfection of a primal being, which

is the origin of all causality? The greatest systematic unity, and

consequently teleological unity, constitutes the very foundation of

the possibility of the most extended employment of human reason. The

idea of unity is therefore essentially and indissolubly connected with

the nature of our reason. This idea is a legislative one; and hence it

is very natural that we should assume the existence of a legislative

reason corresponding to it, from which the systematic unity of nature-

the object of the operations of reason- must be derived.

  In the course of our discussion of the antinomies, we stated that it

is always possible to answer all the questions which pure reason may

raise; and that the plea of the limited nature of our cognition, which

is unavoidable and proper in many questions regarding natural

phenomena, cannot in this case be admitted, because the questions

raised do not relate to the nature of things, but are necessarily

originated by the nature of reason itself, and relate to its own

internal constitution. We can now establish this assertion, which at

first sight appeared so rash, in relation to the two questions in

which reason takes the greatest interest, and thus complete our

discussion of the dialectic of pure reason.

  If, then, the question is asked, in relation to transcendental

theology,* first, whether there is anything distinct from the world,

which contains the ground of cosmical order and connection according

to general laws? The answer is: Certainly. For the world is a sum of

phenomena; there must, therefore, be some transcendental basis of

these phenomena, that is, a basis cogitable by the pure

understanding alone. If, secondly, the question is asked whether

this being is substance, whether it is of the greatest reality,

whether it is necessary, and so forth? I answer that this question

is utterly without meaning. For all the categories which aid me in

forming a conception of an object cannot be employed except in the

world of sense, and are without meaning when not applied to objects of

actual or possible experience. Out of this sphere, they are not

properly conceptions, but the mere marks or indices of conceptions,

which we may admit, although they cannot, without the help of

experience, help us to understand any subject or thing. If, thirdly,

the question is whether we may not cogitate this being, which is

distinct from the world, in analogy with the objects of experience?

The answer is: Undoubtedly, but only as an ideal, and not as a real

object. That is, we must cogitate it only as an unknown substratum

of the systematic unity, order, and finality of the world- a unity

which reason must employ as the regulative principle of its

investigation of nature. Nay, more, we may admit into the idea certain

anthropomorphic elements, which are promotive of the interests of this

regulative principle. For it is no more than an idea, which does not

relate directly to a being distinct from the world, but to the

regulative principle of the systematic unity of the world, by means,

however, of a schema of this unity- the schema of a Supreme

Intelligence, who is the wisely-designing author of the universe. What

this basis of cosmical unity may be in itself, we know not- we

cannot discover from the idea; we merely know how we ought to employ

the idea of this unity, in relation to the systematic operation of

reason in the sphere of experience.



  *After what has been said of the psychological idea of the ego and

its proper employment as a regulative principle of the operations of

reason, I need not enter into details regarding the transcendental

illusion by which the systematic unity of all the various phenomena of

the internal sense is hypostatized. The procedure is in this case very

similar to that which has been discussed in our remarks on the

theological ideal.



  But, it will be asked again, can we on these grounds, admit the

existence of a wise and omnipotent author of the world? Without doubt;

and not only so, but we must assume the existence of such a being. But

do we thus extend the limits of our knowledge beyond the field of

possible experience? By no means. For we have merely presupposed a

something, of which we have no conception, which we do not know as

it is in itself; but, in relation to the systematic disposition of the

universe, which we must presuppose in all our observation of nature,

we have cogitated this unknown being in analogy with an intelligent

existence (an empirical conception), that is to say, we have endowed

it with those attributes, which, judging from the nature of our own

reason, may contain the ground of such a systematic unity. This idea

is therefore valid only relatively to the employment in experience

of our reason. But if we attribute to it absolute and objective

validity, we overlook the fact that it is merely an ideal being that

we cogitate; and, by setting out from a basis which is not

determinable by considerations drawn from experience, we place

ourselves in a position which incapacitates us from applying this

principle to the empirical employment of reason.

  But, it will be asked further, can I make any use of this conception

and hypothesis in my investigations into the world and nature? Yes,

for this very purpose was the idea established by reason as a

fundamental basis. But may I regard certain arrangements, which seemed

to have been made in conformity with some fixed aim, as the

arrangements of design, and look upon them as proceeding from the

divine will, with the intervention, however, of certain other

particular arrangements disposed to that end? Yes, you may do so;

but at the same time you must regard it as indifferent, whether it

is asserted that divine wisdom has disposed all things in conformity

with his highest aims, or that the idea of supreme wisdom is a

regulative principle in the investigation of nature, and at the same

time a principle of the systematic unity of nature according to

general laws, even in those cases where we are unable to discover that

unity. In other words, it must be perfectly indifferent to you whether

you say, when you have discovered this unity: God has wisely willed it

so; or: Nature has wisely arranged this. For it was nothing but the

systematic unity, which reason requires as a basis for the

investigation of nature, that justified you in accepting the idea of a

supreme intelligence as a schema for a regulative principle; and,

the farther you advance in the discovery of design and finality, the

more certain the validity of your idea. But, as the whole aim of

this regulative principle was the discovery of a necessary and

systematic unity in nature, we have, in so far as we attain this, to

attribute our success to the idea of a Supreme Being; while, at the

same time, we cannot, without involving ourselves in contradictions,

overlook the general laws of nature, as it was in reference to them

alone that this idea was employed. We cannot, I say, overlook the

general laws of nature, and regard this conformity to aims

observable in nature as contingent or hyperphysical in its origin;

inasmuch as there is no ground which can justify us in the admission

of a being with such properties distinct from and above nature. All

that we are authorized to assert is that this idea may be employed

as a principle, and that the properties of the being which is

assumed to correspond to it may be regarded as systematically

connected in analogy with the causal determination of phenomena.

  For the same reasons we are justified in introducing into the idea

of the supreme cause other anthropomorphic elements (for without these

we could not predicate anything of it); we may regard it as

allowable to cogitate this cause as a being with understanding, the

feelings of pleasure and displeasure, and faculties of desire and will

corresponding to these. At the same time, we may attribute to this

being infinite perfection- a perfection which necessarily transcends

that which our knowledge of the order and design in the world

authorize us to predicate of it. For the regulative law of

systematic unity requires us to study nature on the supposition that

systematic and final unity in infinitum is everywhere discoverable,

even in the highest diversity. For, although we may discover little of

this cosmical perfection, it belongs to the legislative prerogative of

reason to require us always to seek for and to expect it; while it

must always be beneficial to institute all inquiries into nature in

accordance with this principle. But it is evident that, by this idea

of a supreme author of all, which I place as the foundation of all

inquiries into nature, I do not mean to assert the existence of such a

being, or that I have any knowledge of its existence; and,

consequently, I do not really deduce anything from the existence of

this being, but merely from its idea, that is to say, from the

nature of things in this world, in accordance with this idea. A

certain dim consciousness of the true use of this idea seems to have

dictated to the philosophers of all times the moderate language used

by them regarding the cause of the world. We find them employing the

expressions wisdom and care of nature, and divine wisdom, as

synonymous- nay, in purely speculative discussions, preferring the

former, because it does not carry the appearance of greater

pretensions than such as we are entitled to make, and at the same time

directs reason to its proper field of action- nature and her

phenomena.

  Thus, pure reason, which at first seemed to promise us nothing

less than the extension of our cognition beyond the limits of

experience, is found, when thoroughly examined, to contain nothing but

regulative principles, the virtue and function of which is to

introduce into our cognition a higher degree of unity than the

understanding could of itself. These principles, by placing the goal

of all our struggles at so great a distance, realize for us the most

thorough connection between the different parts of our cognition,

and the highest degree of systematic unity. But, on the other hand, if

misunderstood and employed as constitutive principles of

transcendent cognition, they become the parents of illusions and

contradictions, while pretending to introduce us to new regions of

knowledge.



  Thus all human cognition begins with intuitions, proceeds from

thence to conceptions, and ends with ideas. Although it possesses,

in relation to all three elements, a priori sources of cognition,

which seemed to transcend the limits of all experience, a

thoroughgoing criticism demonstrates that speculative reason can

never, by the aid of these elements, pass the bounds of possible

experience, and that the proper destination of this highest faculty of

cognition is to employ all methods, and all the principles of these

methods, for the purpose of penetrating into the innermost secrets

of nature, by the aid of the principles of unity (among all kinds of

which teleological unity is the highest), while it ought not to

attempt to soar above the sphere of experience, beyond which there

lies nought for us but the void inane. The critical examination, in

our Transcendental Analytic, of all the propositions which professed

to extend cognition beyond the sphere of experience, completely

demonstrated that they can only conduct us to a possible experience.

If we were not distrustful even of the clearest abstract theorems,

if we were not allured by specious and inviting prospects to escape

from the constraining power of their evidence, we might spare

ourselves the laborious examination of all the dialectical arguments

which a transcendent reason adduces in support of its pretensions; for

we should know with the most complete certainty that, however honest

such professions might be, they are null and valueless, because they

relate to a kind of knowledge to which no man can by any possibility

attain. But, as there is no end to discussion, if we cannot discover

the true cause of the illusions by which even the wisest are deceived,

and as the analysis of all our transcendent cognition into its

elements is of itself of no slight value as a psychological study,

while it is a duty incumbent on every philosopher- it was found

necessary to investigate the dialectical procedure of reason in its

primary sources. And as the inferences of which this dialectic is

the parent are not only deceitful, but naturally possess a profound

interest for humanity, it was advisable at the same time, to give a

full account of the momenta of this dialectical procedure, and to

deposit it in the archives of human reason, as a warning to all future

metaphysicians to avoid these causes of speculative error.

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This World Wide Web document is a personal research project motivated by the following claim: "Truth is the object of Knowledge of whatever kind; and when we inquire what is meant by Truth, I suppose it is right to answer that Truth means facts and their relations, which stand towards each other pretty much as subjects and predicates in logic. All that exists, as contemplated by the human mind, forms one large system or complex fact, and this of course resolves itself into an indefinite number of particular facts, which, as being portions of a whole, have countless relations of every kind, one towards another." (The Idea of a University, John Henry Newman, 1801-1890)

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