SECTION II. Of Transcendental Ideas.
Transcendental analytic showed us how the mere logical form of our
cognition can contain the origin of pure conceptions a priori,
conceptions which represent objects antecedently to all experience, or
rather, indicate the synthetical unity which alone renders possible an
empirical cognition of objects. The form of judgements- converted into
a conception of the synthesis of intuitions- produced the categories
which direct the employment of the understanding in experience. This
consideration warrants us to expect that the form of syllogisms,
when applied to synthetical unity of intuitions, following the rule of
the categories, will contain the origin of particular a priori
conceptions, which we may call pure conceptions of reason or
transcendental ideas, and which will determine the use of the
understanding in the totality of experience according to principles.
The function of reason in arguments consists in the universality
of a cognition according to conceptions, and the syllogism itself is a
judgement which is determined a priori in the whole extent of its
condition. The proposition: "Caius is mortal," is one which may be
obtained from experience by the aid of the understanding alone; but my
wish is to find a conception which contains the condition under
which the predicate of this judgement is given- in this case, the
conception of man- and after subsuming under this condition, taken
in its whole extent (all men are mortal), I determine according to
it the cognition of the object thought, and say: "Caius is mortal."
Hence, in the conclusion of a syllogism we restrict a predicate to a
certain object, after having thought it in the major in its whole
extent under a certain condition. This complete quantity of the extent
in relation to such a condition is called universality
(universalitas). To this corresponds totality (universitas) of
conditions in the synthesis of intuitions. The transcendental
conception of reason is therefore nothing else than the conception
of the totality of the conditions of a given conditioned. Now as the
unconditioned alone renders possible totality of conditions, and,
conversely, the totality of conditions is itself always unconditioned;
a pure rational conception in general can be defined and explained
by means of the conception of the unconditioned, in so far as it
contains a basis for the synthesis of the conditioned.
To the number of modes of relation which the understanding cogitates
by means of the categories, the number of pure rational conceptions
will correspond. We must therefore seek for, first, an unconditioned
of the categorical synthesis in a subject; secondly, of the
hypothetical synthesis of the members of a series; thirdly, of the
disjunctive synthesis of parts in a system.
There are exactly the same number of modes of syllogisms, each of
which proceeds through prosyllogisms to the unconditioned- one to
the subject which cannot be employed as predicate, another to the
presupposition which supposes nothing higher than itself, and the
third to an aggregate of the members of the complete division of a
conception. Hence the pure rational conceptions of totality in the
synthesis of conditions have a necessary foundation in the nature of
human reason- at least as modes of elevating the unity of the
understanding to the unconditioned. They may have no valid
application, corresponding to their transcendental employment, in
concreto, and be thus of no greater utility than to direct the
understanding how, while extending them as widely as possible, to
maintain its exercise and application in perfect consistence and
harmony.
But, while speaking here of the totality of conditions and of the
unconditioned as the common title of all conceptions of reason, we
again light upon an expression which we find it impossible to dispense
with, and which nevertheless, owing to the ambiguity attaching to it
from long abuse, we cannot employ with safety. The word absolute is
one of the few words which, in its original signification, was
perfectly adequate to the conception it was intended to convey- a
conception which no other word in the same language exactly suits, and
the loss- or, which is the same thing, the incautious and loose
employment- of which must be followed by the loss of the conception
itself. And, as it is a conception which occupies much of the
attention of reason, its loss would be greatly to the detriment of all
transcendental philosophy. The word absolute is at present
frequently used to denote that something can be predicated of a
thing considered in itself and intrinsically. In this sense absolutely
possible would signify that which is possible in itself (interne)-
which is, in fact, the least that one can predicate of an object. On
the other hand, it is sometimes employed to indicate that a thing is
valid in all respects- for example, absolute sovereignty. Absolutely
possible would in this sense signify that which is possible in all
relations and in every respect; and this is the most that can be
predicated of the possibility of a thing. Now these significations
do in truth frequently coincide. Thus, for example, that which is
intrinsically impossible, is also impossible in all relations, that
is, absolutely impossible. But in most cases they differ from each
other toto caelo, and I can by no means conclude that, because a thing
is in itself possible, it is also possible in all relations, and
therefore absolutely. Nay, more, I shall in the sequel show that
absolute necessity does not by any means depend on internal necessity,
and that, therefore, it must not be considered as synonymous with
it. Of an opposite which is intrinsically impossible, we may affirm
that it is in all respects impossible, and that, consequently, the
thing itself, of which this is the opposite, is absolutely
necessary; but I cannot reason conversely and say, the opposite of
that which is absolutely necessary is intrinsically impossible, that
is, that the absolute necessity of things is an internal necessity.
For this internal necessity is in certain cases a mere empty word with
which the least conception cannot be connected, while the conception
of the necessity of a thing in all relations possesses very peculiar
determinations. Now as the loss of a conception of great utility in
speculative science cannot be a matter of indifference to the
philosopher, I trust that the proper determination and careful
preservation of the expression on which the conception depends will
likewise be not indifferent to him.
In this enlarged signification, then, shall I employ the word
absolute, in opposition to that which is valid only in some particular
respect; for the latter is restricted by conditions, the former is
valid without any restriction whatever.
Now the transcendental conception of reason has for its object
nothing else than absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions and
does not rest satisfied till it has attained to the absolutely, that
is, in all respects and relations, unconditioned. For pure reason
leaves to the understanding everything that immediately relates to the
object of intuition or rather to their synthesis in imagination. The
former restricts itself to the absolute totality in the employment
of the conceptions of the understanding and aims at carrying out the
synthetical unity which is cogitated in the category, even to the
unconditioned. This unity may hence be called the rational unity of
phenomena, as the other, which the category expresses, may be termed
the unity of the understanding. Reason, therefore, has an immediate
relation to the use of the understanding, not indeed in so far as
the latter contains the ground of possible experience (for the
conception of the absolute totality of conditions is not a
conception that can be employed in experience, because no experience
is unconditioned), but solely for the purpose of directing it to a
certain unity, of which the understanding has no conception, and the
aim of which is to collect into an absolute whole all acts of the
understanding. Hence the objective employment of the pure
conceptions of reason is always transcendent, while that of the pure
conceptions of the understanding must, according to their nature, be
always immanent, inasmuch as they are limited to possible experience.
I understand by idea a necessary conception of reason, to which no
corresponding object can be discovered in the world of sense.
Accordingly, the pure conceptions of reason at present under
consideration are transcendental ideas. They are conceptions of pure
reason, for they regard all empirical cognition as determined by means
of an absolute totality of conditions. They are not mere fictions, but
natural and necessary products of reason, and have hence a necessary
relation to the whole sphere of the exercise of the understanding.
And, finally, they are transcendent, and overstep the limits of all
experiences, in which, consequently, no object can ever be presented
that would be perfectly adequate to a transcendental idea. When we use
the word idea, we say, as regards its object (an object of the pure
understanding), a great deal, but as regards its subject (that is,
in respect of its reality under conditions of experience), exceedingly
little, because the idea, as the conception of a maximum, can never be
completely and adequately presented in concreto. Now, as in the merely
speculative employment of reason the latter is properly the sole
aim, and as in this case the approximation to a conception, which is
never attained in practice, is the same thing as if the conception
were non-existent- it is commonly said of the conception of this kind,
"it is only an idea." So we might very well say, "the absolute
totality of all phenomena is only an idea," for, as we never can
present an adequate representation of it, it remains for us a
problem incapable of solution. On the other hand, as in the
practical use of the understanding we have only to do with action
and practice according to rules, an idea of pure reason can always
be given really in concreto, although only partially, nay, it is the
indispensable condition of all practical employment of reason. The
practice or execution of the idea is always limited and defective, but
nevertheless within indeterminable boundaries, consequently always
under the influence of the conception of an absolute perfection. And
thus the practical idea is always in the highest degree fruitful,
and in relation to real actions indispensably necessary. In the
idea, pure reason possesses even causality and the power of
producing that which its conception contains. Hence we cannot say of
wisdom, in a disparaging way, "it is only an idea." For, for the
very reason that it is the idea of the necessary unity of all possible
aims, it must be for all practical exertions and endeavours the
primitive condition and rule- a rule which, if not constitutive, is at
least limitative.
Now, although we must say of the transcendental conceptions of
reason, "they are only ideas," we must not, on this account, look upon
them as superfluous and nugatory. For, although no object can be
determined by them, they can be of great utility, unobserved and at
the basis of the edifice of the understanding, as the canon for its
extended and self-consistent exercise- a canon which, indeed, does not
enable it to cognize more in an object than it would cognize by the
help of its own conceptions, but which guides it more securely in
its cognition. Not to mention that they perhaps render possible a
transition from our conceptions of nature and the non-ego to the
practical conceptions, and thus produce for even ethical ideas
keeping, so to speak, and connection with the speculative cognitions
of reason. The explication of all this must be looked for in the
sequel.
But setting aside, in conformity with our original purpose, the
consideration of the practical ideas, we proceed to contemplate reason
in its speculative use alone, nay, in a still more restricted
sphere, to wit, in the transcendental use; and here must strike into
the same path which we followed in our deduction of the categories.
That is to say, we shall consider the logical form of the cognition of
reason, that we may see whether reason may not be thereby a source
of conceptions which enables us to regard objects in themselves as
determined synthetically a priori, in relation to one or other of
the functions of reason.
Reason, considered as the faculty of a certain logical form of
cognition, is the faculty of conclusion, that is, of mediate
judgement- by means of the subsumption of the condition of a
possible judgement under the condition of a given judgement. The given
judgement is the general rule (major). The subsumption of the
condition of another possible judgement under the condition of the
rule is the minor. The actual judgement, which enounces the
assertion of the rule in the subsumed case, is the conclusion
(conclusio). The rule predicates something generally under a certain
condition. The condition of the rule is satisfied in some particular
case. It follows that what was valid in general under that condition
must also be considered as valid in the particular case which
satisfies this condition. It is very plain that reason attains to a
cognition, by means of acts of the understanding which constitute a
series of conditions. When I arrive at the proposition, "All bodies
are changeable," by beginning with the more remote cognition (in which
the conception of body does not appear, but which nevertheless
contains the condition of that conception), "All compound is
changeable," by proceeding from this to a less remote cognition, which
stands under the condition of the former, "Bodies are compound," and
hence to a third, which at length connects for me the remote cognition
(changeable) with the one before me, "Consequently, bodies are
changeable"- I have arrived at a cognition (conclusion) through a
series of conditions (premisses). Now every series, whose exponent (of
the categorical or hypothetical judgement) is given, can be continued;
consequently the same procedure of reason conducts us to the
ratiocinatio polysyllogistica, which is a series of syllogisms, that
can be continued either on the side of the conditions (per
prosyllogismos) or of the conditioned (per episyllogismos) to an
indefinite extent.
But we very soon perceive that the chain or series of prosyllogisms,
that is, of deduced cognitions on the side of the grounds or
conditions of a given cognition, in other words, the ascending
series of syllogisms must have a very different relation to the
faculty of reason from that of the descending series, that is, the
progressive procedure of reason on the side of the conditioned by
means of episyllogisms. For, as in the former case the cognition
(conclusio) is given only as conditioned, reason can attain to this
cognition only under the presupposition that all the members of the
series on the side of the conditions are given (totality in the series
of premisses), because only under this supposition is the judgement we
may be considering possible a priori; while on the side of the
conditioned or the inferences, only an incomplete and becoming, and
not a presupposed or given series, consequently only a potential
progression, is cogitated. Hence, when a cognition is contemplated
as conditioned, reason is compelled to consider the series of
conditions in an ascending line as completed and given in their
totality. But if the very same condition is considered at the same
time as the condition of other cognitions, which together constitute a
series of inferences or consequences in a descending line, reason
may preserve a perfect indifference, as to how far this progression
may extend a parte posteriori, and whether the totality of this series
is possible, because it stands in no need of such a series for the
purpose of arriving at the conclusion before it, inasmuch as this
conclusion is sufficiently guaranteed and determined on grounds a
parte priori. It may be the case, that upon the side of the conditions
the series of premisses has a first or highest condition, or it may
not possess this, and so be a parte priori unlimited; but it must,
nevertheless, contain totality of conditions, even admitting that we
never could succeed in completely apprehending it; and the whole
series must be unconditionally true, if the conditioned, which is
considered as an inference resulting from it, is to be held as true.
This is a requirement of reason, which announces its cognition as
determined a priori and as necessary, either in itself- and in this
case it needs no grounds to rest upon- or, if it is deduced, as a
member of a series of grounds, which is itself unconditionally true.
