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The Critique of Pure Reason - Of the Conceptions of Pure Reason

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)


             OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF PURE REASON.



  The conceptions of pure reason- we do not here speak of the

possibility of them- are not obtained by reflection, but by

inference or conclusion. The conceptions of understanding are also

cogitated a priori antecedently to experience, and render it possible;

but they contain nothing but the unity of reflection upon phenomena,

in so far as these must necessarily belong to a possible empirical

consciousness. Through them alone are cognition and the

determination of an object possible. It is from them, accordingly,

that we receive material for reasoning, and antecedently to them we

possess no a priori conceptions of objects from which they might be

deduced, On the other hand, the sole basis of their objective

reality consists in the necessity imposed on them, as containing the

intellectual form of all experience, of restricting their

application and influence to the sphere of experience.

  But the term, conception of reason, or rational conception, itself

indicates that it does not confine itself within the limits of

experience, because its object-matter is a cognition, of which every

empirical cognition is but a part- nay, the whole of possible

experience may be itself but a part of it- a cognition to which no

actual experience ever fully attains, although it does always

pertain to it. The aim of rational conceptions is the comprehension,

as that of the conceptions of understanding is the understanding of

perceptions. If they contain the unconditioned, they relate to that to

which all experience is subordinate, but which is never itself an

object of experience- that towards which reason tends in all its

conclusions from experience, and by the standard of which it estimates

the degree of their empirical use, but which is never itself an

element in an empirical synthesis. If, notwithstanding, such

conceptions possess objective validity, they may be called conceptus

ratiocinati (conceptions legitimately concluded); in cases where

they do not, they have been admitted on account of having the

appearance of being correctly concluded, and may be called conceptus

ratiocinantes (sophistical conceptions). But as this can only be

sufficiently demonstrated in that part of our treatise which relates

to the dialectical conclusions of reason, we shall omit any

consideration of it in this place. As we called the pure conceptions

of the understanding categories, we shall also distinguish those of

pure reason by a new name and call them transcendental ideas. These

terms, however, we must in the first place explain and justify.

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This World Wide Web document is a personal research project motivated by the following claim: "Truth is the object of Knowledge of whatever kind; and when we inquire what is meant by Truth, I suppose it is right to answer that Truth means facts and their relations, which stand towards each other pretty much as subjects and predicates in logic. All that exists, as contemplated by the human mind, forms one large system or complex fact, and this of course resolves itself into an indefinite number of particular facts, which, as being portions of a whole, have countless relations of every kind, one towards another." (The Idea of a University, John Henry Newman, 1801-1890)


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