APPENDIX.
Of the Equivocal Nature or Amphiboly of the Conceptions of
Reflection from the Confusion of the Transcendental with
the Empirical use of the Understanding.
Reflection (reflexio) is not occupied about objects themselves,
for the purpose of directly obtaining conceptions of them, but is that
state of the mind in which we set ourselves to discover the subjective
conditions under which we obtain conceptions. It is the
consciousness of the relation of given representations to the
different sources or faculties of cognition, by which alone their
relation to each other can be rightly determined. The first question
which occurs in considering our representations is to what faculty
of cognition do they belong? To the understanding or to the senses?
Many judgements are admitted to be true from mere habit or
inclination; but, because reflection neither precedes nor follows,
it is held to be a judgement that has its origin in the understanding.
All judgements do not require examination, that is, investigation into
the grounds of their truth. For, when they are immediately certain
(for example: "Between two points there can be only one straight
line"), no better or less mediate test of their truth can be found
than that which they themselves contain and express. But all
judgement, nay, all comparisons require reflection, that is, a
distinction of the faculty of cognition to which the given conceptions
belong. The act whereby I compare my representations with the
faculty of cognition which originates them, and whereby I
distinguish whether they are compared with each other as belonging
to the pure understanding or to sensuous intuition, I term
transcendental reflection. Now, the relations in which conceptions can
stand to each other are those of identity and difference, agreement
and opposition, of the internal and external, finally, of the
determinable and the determining (matter and form). The proper
determination of these relations rests on the question, to what
faculty of cognition they subjectively belong, whether to
sensibility or understanding? For, on the manner in which we solve
this question depends the manner in which we must cogitate these
relations.
Before constructing any objective judgement, we compare the
conceptions that are to be placed in the judgement, and observe
whether there exists identity (of many representations in one
conception), if a general judgement is to be constructed, or
difference, if a particular; whether there is agreement when
affirmative; and opposition when negative judgements are to be
constructed, and so on. For this reason we ought to call these
conceptions, conceptions of comparison (conceptus comparationis).
But as, when the question is not as to the logical form, but as to the
content of conceptions, that is to say, whether the things
themselves are identical or different, in agreement or opposition, and
so on, the things can have a twofold relation to our faculty of
cognition, to wit, a relation either to sensibility or to the
understanding, and as on this relation depends their relation to
each other, transcendental reflection, that is, the relation of
given representations to one or the other faculty of cognition, can
alone determine this latter relation. Thus we shall not be able to
discover whether the things are identical or different, in agreement
or opposition, etc., from the mere conception of the things by means
of comparison (comparatio), but only by distinguishing the mode of
cognition to which they belong, in other words, by means of
transcendental reflection. We may, therefore, with justice say, that
logical reflection is mere comparison, for in it no account is taken
of the faculty of cognition to which the given conceptions belong, and
they are consequently, as far as regards their origin, to be treated
as homogeneous; while transcendental reflection (which applies to
the objects themselves) contains the ground of the possibility of
objective comparison of representations with each other, and is
therefore very different from the former, because the faculties of
cognition to which they belong are not even the same. Transcendental
reflection is a duty which no one can neglect who wishes to
establish an a priori judgement upon things. We shall now proceed to
fulfil this duty, and thereby throw not a little light on the question
as to the determination of the proper business of the understanding.
1. Identity and Difference. When an object is presented to us
several times, but always with the same internal determinations
(qualitas et quantitas), it, if an object of pure understanding, is
always the same, not several things, but only one thing (numerica
identitas); but if a phenomenon, we do not concern ourselves with
comparing the conception of the thing with the conception of some
other, but, although they may be in this respect perfectly the same,
the difference of place at the same time is a sufficient ground for
asserting the numerical difference of these objects (of sense).
Thus, in the case of two drops of water, we may make complete
abstraction of all internal difference (quality and quantity), and,
the fact that they are intuited at the same time in different
places, is sufficient to justify us in holding them to be
numerically different. Leibnitz regarded phenomena as things in
themselves, consequently as intelligibilia, that is, objects of pure
understanding (although, on account of the confused nature of their
representations, he gave them the name of phenomena), and in this case
his principle of the indiscernible (principium identatis
indiscernibilium) is not to be impugned. But, as phenomena are objects
of sensibility, and, as the understanding, in respect of them, must be
employed empirically and not purely or transcendentally, plurality and
numerical difference are given by space itself as the condition of
external phenomena. For one part of space, although it may be
perfectly similar and equal to another part, is still without it,
and for this reason alone is different from the latter, which is added
to it in order to make up a greater space. It follows that this must
hold good of all things that are in the different parts of space at
the same time, however similar and equal one may be to another.
2. Agreement and Opposition. When reality is represented by the pure
understanding (realitas noumenon), opposition between realities is
incogitable- such a relation, that is, that when these realities are
connected in one subject, they annihilate the effects of each other
and may be represented in the formula 3 - 3 = 0. On the other hand,
the real in a phenomenon (realitas phaenomenon) may very well be in
mutual opposition, and, when united in the same subject, the one may
completely or in part annihilate the effect or consequence of the
other; as in the case of two moving forces in the same straight line
drawing or impelling a point in opposite directions, or in the case of
a pleasure counterbalancing a certain amount of pain.
3. The Internal and External. In an object of the pure
understanding, only that is internal which has no relation (as regards
its existence) to anything different from itself. On the other hand,
the internal determinations of a substantia phaenomenon in space are
nothing but relations, and it is itself nothing more than a complex of
mere relations. Substance in space we are cognizant of only through
forces operative in it, either drawing others towards itself
(attraction), or preventing others from forcing into itself (repulsion
and impenetrability). We know no other properties that make up the
conception of substance phenomenal in space, and which we term matter.
On the other hand, as an object of the pure understanding, every
substance must have internal determination and forces. But what
other internal attributes of such an object can I think than those
which my internal sense presents to me? That, to wit, which in
either itself thought, or something analogous to it. Hence Leibnitz,
who looked upon things as noumena, after denying them everything
like external relation, and therefore also composition or combination,
declared that all substances, even the component parts of matter, were
simple substances with powers of representation, in one word, monads.
4. Matter and Form. These two conceptions lie at the foundation of
all other reflection, so inseparably are they connected with every
mode of exercising the understanding. The former denotes the
determinable in general, the second its determination, both in a
transcendental sense, abstraction being made of every difference in
that which is given, and of the mode in which it is determined.
Logicians formerly termed the universal, matter, the specific
difference of this or that part of the universal, form. In a judgement
one may call the given conceptions logical matter (for the judgement),
the relation of these to each other (by means of the copula), the form
of the judgement. In an object, the composite parts thereof
(essentialia) are the matter; the mode in which they are connected
in the object, the form. In respect to things in general, unlimited
reality was regarded as the matter of all possibility, the
limitation thereof (negation) as the form, by which one thing is
distinguished from another according to transcendental conceptions.
The understanding demands that something be given (at least in the
conception), in order to be able to determine it in a certain
manner. Hence, in a conception of the pure understanding, the matter
precedes the form, and for this reason Leibnitz first assumed the
existence of things (monads) and of an internal power of
representation in them, in order to found upon this their external
relation and the community their state (that is, of their
representations). Hence, with him, space and time were possible- the
former through the relation of substances, the latter through the
connection of their determinations with each other, as causes and
effects. And so would it really be, if the pure understanding were
capable of an immediate application to objects, and if space and
time were determinations of things in themselves. But being merely
sensuous intuitions, in which we determine all objects solely as
phenomena, the form of intuition (as a subjective property of
sensibility) must antecede all matter (sensations), consequently space
and time must antecede all phenomena and all data of experience, and
rather make experience itself possible. But the intellectual
philosopher could not endure that the form should precede the things
themselves and determine their possibility; an objection perfectly
correct, if we assume that we intuite things as they are, although
with confused representation. But as sensuous intuition is a
peculiar subjective condition, which is a priori at the foundation
of all perception, and the form of which is primitive, the form must
be given per se, and so far from matter (or the things themselves
which appear) lying at the foundation of experience (as we must
conclude, if we judge by mere conceptions), the very possibility of
itself presupposes, on the contrary, a given formal intuition (space
and time).
REMARK ON THE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF REFLECTION.
Let me be allowed to term the position which we assign to a
conception either in the sensibility or in the pure understanding, the
transcendental place. In this manner, the appointment of the
position which must be taken by each conception according to the
difference in its use, and the directions for determining this place
to all conceptions according to rules, would be a transcendental
topic, a doctrine which would thoroughly shield us from the
surreptitious devices of the pure understanding and the delusions
which thence arise, as it would always distinguish to what faculty
of cognition each conception properly belonged. Every conception,
every title, under which many cognitions rank together, may be
called a logical place. Upon this is based the logical topic of
Aristotle, of which teachers and rhetoricians could avail
themselves, in order, under certain titles of thought, to observe what
would best suit the matter they had to treat, and thus enable
themselves to quibble and talk with fluency and an appearance of
profundity.
Transcendental topic, on the contrary, contains nothing more than
the above-mentioned four titles of all comparison and distinction,
which differ from categories in this respect, that they do not
represent the object according to that which constitutes its
conception (quantity, reality), but set forth merely the comparison of
representations, which precedes our conceptions of things. But this
comparison requires a previous reflection, that is, a determination of
the place to which the representations of the things which are
compared belong, whether, to wit, they are cogitated by the pure
understanding, or given by sensibility.
Conceptions may be logically compared without the trouble of
inquiring to what faculty their objects belong, whether as noumena, to
the understanding, or as phenomena, to sensibility. If, however, we
wish to employ these conceptions in respect of objects, previous
transcendental reflection is necessary. Without this reflection I
should make a very unsafe use of these conceptions, and construct
pretended synthetical propositions which critical reason cannot
acknowledge and which are based solely upon a transcendental
amphiboly, that is, upon a substitution of an object of pure
understanding for a phenomenon.
For want of this doctrine of transcendental topic, and
consequently deceived by the amphiboly of the conceptions of
reflection, the celebrated Leibnitz constructed an intellectual system
of the world, or rather, believed himself competent to cognize the
internal nature of things, by comparing all objects merely with the
understanding and the abstract formal conceptions of thought. Our
table of the conceptions of reflection gives us the unexpected
advantage of being able to exhibit the distinctive peculiarities of
his system in all its parts, and at the same time of exposing the
fundamental principle of this peculiar mode of thought, which rested
upon naught but a misconception. He compared all things with each
other merely by means of conceptions, and naturally found no other
differences than those by which the understanding distinguishes its
pure conceptions one from another. The conditions of sensuous
intuition, which contain in themselves their own means of distinction,
he did not look upon as primitive, because sensibility was to him
but a confused mode of representation and not any particular source of
representations. A phenomenon was for him the representation of the
thing in itself, although distinguished from cognition by the
understanding only in respect of the logical form- the former with its
usual want of analysis containing, according to him, a certain mixture
of collateral representations in its conception of a thing, which it
is the duty of the understanding to separate and distinguish. In one
word, Leibnitz intellectualized phenomena, just as Locke, in his
system of noogony (if I may be allowed to make use of such
expressions), sensualized the conceptions of the understanding, that
is to say, declared them to be nothing more than empirical or abstract
conceptions of reflection. Instead of seeking in the understanding and
sensibility two different sources of representations, which,
however, can present us with objective judgements of things only in
conjunction, each of these great men recognized but one of these
faculties, which, in their opinion, applied immediately to things in
themselves, the other having no duty but that of confusing or
arranging the representations of the former.
Accordingly, the objects of sense were compared by Leibnitz as
things in general merely in the understanding.
1st. He compares them in regard to their identity or difference-
as judged by the understanding. As, therefore, he considered merely
the conceptions of objects, and not their position in intuition, in
which alone objects can be given, and left quite out of sight the
transcendental locale of these conceptions- whether, that is, their
object ought to be classed among phenomena, or among things in
themselves, it was to be expected that he should extend the
application of the principle of indiscernibles, which is valid
solely of conceptions of things in general, to objects of sense
(mundus phaenomenon), and that he should believe that he had thereby
contributed in no small degree to extend our knowledge of nature. In
truth, if I cognize in all its inner determinations a drop of water as
a thing in itself, I cannot look upon one drop as different from
another, if the conception of the one is completely identical with
that of the other. But if it is a phenomenon in space, it has a
place not merely in the understanding (among conceptions), but also in
sensuous external intuition (in space), and in this case, the physical
locale is a matter of indifference in regard to the internal
determinations of things, and one place, B, may contain a thing
which is perfectly similar and equal to another in a place, A, just as
well as if the two things were in every respect different from each
other. Difference of place without any other conditions, makes the
plurality and distinction of objects as phenomena, not only possible
in itself, but even necessary. Consequently, the above so-called law
is not a law of nature. It is merely an analytical rule for the
comparison of things by means of mere conceptions.
2nd. The principle: "Realities (as simple affirmations) never
logically contradict each other," is a proposition perfectly true
respecting the relation of conceptions, but, whether as regards
nature, or things in themselves (of which we have not the slightest
conception), is without any the least meaning. For real opposition, in
which A - B is = 0, exists everywhere, an opposition, that is, in
which one reality united with another in the same subject
annihilates the effects of the other- a fact which is constantly
brought before our eyes by the different antagonistic actions and
operations in nature, which, nevertheless, as depending on real
forces, must be called realitates phaenomena. General mechanics can
even present us with the empirical condition of this opposition in
an a priori rule, as it directs its attention to the opposition in the
direction of forces- a condition of which the transcendental
conception of reality can tell us nothing. Although M. Leibnitz did
not announce this proposition with precisely the pomp of a new
principle, he yet employed it for the establishment of new
propositions, and his followers introduced it into their
Leibnitzio-Wolfian system of philosophy. According to this
principle, for example, all evils are but consequences of the
limited nature of created beings, that is, negations, because these
are the only opposite of reality. (In the mere conception of a thing
in general this is really the case, but not in things as phenomena.)
In like manner, the upholders of this system deem it not only
possible, but natural also, to connect and unite all reality in one
being, because they acknowledge no other sort of opposition than
that of contradiction (by which the conception itself of a thing is
annihilated), and find themselves unable to conceive an opposition
of reciprocal destruction, so to speak, in which one real cause
destroys the effect of another, and the conditions of whose
representation we meet with only in sensibility.
3rd. The Leibnitzian monadology has really no better foundation than
on this philosopher's mode of falsely representing the difference of
the internal and external solely in relation to the understanding.
Substances, in general, must have something inward, which is therefore
free from external relations, consequently from that of composition
also. The simple- that which can be represented by a unit- is
therefore the foundation of that which is internal in things in
themselves. The internal state of substances cannot therefore
consist in place, shape, contact, or motion, determinations which
are all external relations, and we can ascribe to them no other than
that whereby we internally determine our faculty of sense itself, that
is to say, the state of representation. Thus, then, were constructed
the monads, which were to form the elements of the universe, the
active force of which consists in representation, the effects of
this force being thus entirely confined to themselves.
For the same reason, his view of the possible community of
substances could not represent it but as a predetermined harmony,
and by no means as a physical influence. For inasmuch as everything is
occupied only internally, that is, with its own representations, the
state of the representations of one substance could not stand in
active and living connection with that of another, but some third
cause operating on all without exception was necessary to make the
different states correspond with one another. And this did not
happen by means of assistance applied in each particular case (systema
assistentiae), but through the unity of the idea of a cause occupied
and connected with all substances, in which they necessarily
receive, according to the Leibnitzian school, their existence and
permanence, consequently also reciprocal correspondence, according
to universal laws.
4th. This philosopher's celebrated doctrine of space and time, in
which he intellectualized these forms of sensibility, originated in
the same delusion of transcendental reflection. If I attempt to
represent by the mere understanding, the external relations of things,
I can do so only by employing the conception of their reciprocal
action, and if I wish to connect one state of the same thing with
another state, I must avail myself of the notion of the order of cause
and effect. And thus Leibnitz regarded space as a certain order in the
community of substances, and time as the dynamical sequence of their
states. That which space and time possess proper to themselves and
independent of things, he ascribed to a necessary confusion in our
conceptions of them, whereby that which is a mere form of dynamical
relations is held to be a self-existent intuition, antecedent even
to things themselves. Thus space and time were the intelligible form
of the connection of things (substances and their states) in
themselves. But things were intelligible substances (substantiae
noumena). At the same time, he made these conceptions valid of
phenomena, because he did not allow to sensibility a peculiar mode
of intuition, but sought all, even the empirical representation of
objects, in the understanding, and left to sense naught but the
despicable task of confusing and disarranging the representations of
the former.
But even if we could frame any synthetical proposition concerning
things in themselves by means of the pure understanding (which is
impossible), it could not apply to phenomena, which do not represent
things in themselves. In such a case I should be obliged in
transcendental reflection to compare my conceptions only under the
conditions of sensibility, and so space and time would not be
determinations of things in themselves, but of phenomena. What
things may be in themselves, I know not and need not know, because a
thing is never presented to me otherwise than as a phenomenon.
I must adopt the same mode of procedure with the other conceptions
of reflection. Matter is substantia phaenomenon. That in it which is
internal I seek to discover in all parts of space which it occupies,
and in all the functions and operations it performs, and which are
indeed never anything but phenomena of the external sense. I cannot
therefore find anything that is absolutely, but only what is
comparatively internal, and which itself consists of external
relations. The absolutely internal in matter, and as it should be
according to the pure understanding, is a mere chimera, for matter
is not an object for the pure understanding. But the transcendental
object, which is the foundation of the phenomenon which we call
matter, is a mere nescio quid, the nature of which we could not
understand, even though someone were found able to tell us. For we can
understand nothing that does not bring with it something in
intuition corresponding to the expressions employed. If, by the
complaint of being unable to perceive the internal nature of things,
it is meant that we do not comprehend by the pure understanding what
the things which appear to us may be in themselves, it is a silly
and unreasonable complaint; for those who talk thus really desire that
we should be able to cognize, consequently to intuite, things
without senses, and therefore wish that we possessed a faculty of
cognition perfectly different from the human faculty, not merely in
degree, but even as regards intuition and the mode thereof, so that
thus we should not be men, but belong to a class of beings, the
possibility of whose existence, much less their nature and
constitution, we have no means of cognizing. By observation and
analysis of phenomena we penetrate into the interior of nature, and no
one can say what progress this knowledge may make in time. But those
transcendental questions which pass beyond the limits of nature, we
could never answer, even although all nature were laid open to us,
because we have not the power of observing our own mind with any other
intuition than that of our internal sense. For herein lies the mystery
of the origin and source of our faculty of sensibility. Its
application to an object, and the transcendental ground of this
unity of subjective and objective, lie too deeply concealed for us,
who cognize ourselves only through the internal sense, consequently as
phenomena, to be able to discover in our existence anything but
phenomena, the non-sensuous cause of which we at the same time
earnestly desire to penetrate to.
The great utility of this critique of conclusions arrived at by
the processes of mere reflection consists in its clear demonstration
of the nullity of all conclusions respecting objects which are
compared with each other in the understanding alone, while it at the
same time confirms what we particularly insisted on, namely, that,
although phenomena are not included as things in themselves among
the objects of the pure understanding, they are nevertheless the
only things by which our cognition can possess objective reality, that
is to say, which give us intuitions to correspond with our
conceptions.
When we reflect in a purely logical manner, we do nothing more
than compare conceptions in our understanding, to discover whether
both have the same content, whether they are self-contradictory or
not, whether anything is contained in either conception, which of
the two is given, and which is merely a mode of thinking that given.
But if I apply these conceptions to an object in general (in the
transcendental sense), without first determining whether it is an
object of sensuous or intellectual intuition, certain limitations
present themselves, which forbid us to pass beyond the conceptions and
render all empirical use of them impossible. And thus these
limitations prove that the representation of an object as a thing in
general is not only insufficient, but, without sensuous
determination and independently of empirical conditions,
self-contradictory; that we must therefore make abstraction of all
objects, as in logic, or, admitting them, must think them under
conditions of sensuous intuition; that, consequently, the intelligible
requires an altogether peculiar intuition, which we do not possess,
and in the absence of which it is for us nothing; while, on the
other hand phenomena cannot be objects in themselves. For, when I
merely think things in general, the difference in their external
relations cannot constitute a difference in the things themselves;
on the contrary, the former presupposes the latter, and if the
conception of one of two things is not internally different from
that of the other, I am merely thinking the same thing in different
relations. Further, by the addition of one affirmation (reality) to
the other, the positive therein is really augmented, and nothing is
abstracted or withdrawn from it; hence the real in things cannot be in
contradiction with or opposition to itself- and so on.
The true use of the conceptions of reflection in the employment of
the understanding has, as we have shown, been so misconceived by
Leibnitz, one of the most acute philosophers of either ancient or
modern times, that he has been misled into the construction of a
baseless system of intellectual cognition, which professes to
determine its objects without the intervention of the senses. For this
reason, the exposition of the cause of the amphiboly of these
conceptions, as the origin of these false principles, is of great
utility in determining with certainty the proper limits of the
understanding.
It is right to say whatever is affirmed or denied of the whole of
a conception can be affirmed or denied of any part of it (dictum de
omni et nullo); but it would be absurd so to alter this logical
proposition as to say whatever is not contained in a general
conception is likewise not contained in the particular conceptions
which rank under it; for the latter are particular conceptions, for
the very reason that their content is greater than that which is
cogitated in the general conception. And yet the whole intellectual
system of Leibnitz is based upon this false principle, and with it
must necessarily fall to the ground, together with all the ambiguous
principles in reference to the employment of the understanding which
have thence originated.
Leibnitz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles or
indistinguishables is really based on the presupposition that, if in
the conception of a thing a certain distinction is not to be found, it
is also not to be met with in things themselves; that, consequently,
all things are completely identical (numero eadem) which are not
distinguishable from each other (as to quality or quantity) in our
conceptions of them. But, as in the mere conception of anything
abstraction has been made of many necessary conditions of intuition,
that of which abstraction has been made is rashly held to be
non-existent, and nothing is attributed to the thing but what is
contained in its conception.
The conception of a cubic foot of space, however I may think it,
is in itself completely identical. But two cubic feet in space are
nevertheless distinct from each other from the sole fact of their
being in different places (they are numero diversa); and these
places are conditions of intuition, wherein the object of this
conception is given, and which do not belong to the conception, but to
the faculty of sensibility. In like manner, there is in the conception
of a thing no contradiction when a negative is not connected with an
affirmative; and merely affirmative conceptions cannot, in
conjunction, produce any negation. But in sensuous intuition,
wherein reality (take for example, motion) is given, we find
conditions (opposite directions)- of which abstraction has been made
in the conception of motion in general- which render possible a
contradiction or opposition (not indeed of a logical kind)- and
which from pure positives produce zero = 0. We are therefore not
justified in saying that all reality is in perfect agreement and
harmony, because no contradiction is discoverable among its
conceptions.* According to mere conceptions, that which is internal is
the substratum of all relations or external determinations. When,
therefore, I abstract all conditions of intuition, and confine
myself solely to the conception of a thing in general, I can make
abstraction of all external relations, and there must nevertheless
remain a conception of that which indicates no relation, but merely
internal determinations. Now it seems to follow that in everything
(substance) there is something which is absolutely internal and
which antecedes all external determinations, inasmuch as it renders
them possible; and that therefore this substratum is something which
does not contain any external relations and is consequently simple
(for corporeal things are never anything but relations, at least of
their parts external to each other); and, inasmuch as we know of no
other absolutely internal determinations than those of the internal
sense, this substratum is not only simple, but also, analogously
with our internal sense, determined through representations, that is
to say, all things are properly monads, or simple beings endowed
with the power of representation. Now all this would be perfectly
correct, if the conception of a thing were the only necessary
condition of the presentation of objects of external intuition. It is,
on the contrary, manifest that a permanent phenomenon in space
(impenetrable extension) can contain mere relations, and nothing
that is absolutely internal, and yet be the primary substratum of
all external perception. By mere conceptions I cannot think anything
external, without, at the same time, thinking something internal,
for the reason that conceptions of relations presuppose given
things, and without these are impossible. But, as an intuition there
is something (that is, space, which, with all it contains, consists of
purely formal, or, indeed, real relations) which is not found in the
mere conception of a thing in general, and this presents to us the
substratum which could not be cognized through conceptions alone, I
cannot say: because a thing cannot be represented by mere
conceptions without something absolutely internal, there is also, in
the things themselves which are contained under these conceptions, and
in their intuition nothing external to which something absolutely
internal does not serve as the foundation. For, when we have made
abstraction of all the conditions of intuition, there certainly
remains in the mere conception nothing but the internal in general,
through which alone the external is possible. But this necessity,
which is grounded upon abstraction alone, does not obtain in the
case of things themselves, in so far as they are given in intuition
with such determinations as express mere relations, without having
anything internal as their foundation; for they are not things of a
thing of which we can neither for they are not things in themselves,
but only phenomena. What we cognize in matter is nothing but relations
(what we call its internal determinations are but comparatively
internal). But there are some self-subsistent and permanent, through
which a determined object is given. That I, when abstraction is made
of these relations, have nothing more to think, does not destroy the
conception of a thing as phenomenon, nor the conception of an object
in abstracto, but it does away with the possibility of an object
that is determinable according to mere conceptions, that is, of a
noumenon. It is certainly startling to hear that a thing consists
solely of relations; but this thing is simply a phenomenon, and cannot
be cogitated by means of the mere categories: it does itself consist
in the mere relation of something in general to the senses. In the
same way, we cannot cogitate relations of things in abstracto, if we
commence with conceptions alone, in any other manner than that one
is the cause of determinations in the other; for that is itself the
conception of the understanding or category of relation. But, as in
this case we make abstraction of all intuition, we lose altogether the
mode in which the manifold determines to each of its parts its
place, that is, the form of sensibility (space); and yet this mode
antecedes all empirical causality.
*If any one wishes here to have recourse to the usual subterfuge,
and to say, that at least realitates noumena cannot be in opposition
to each other, it will be requisite for him to adduce an example of
this pure and non-sensuous reality, that it may be understood
whether the notion represents something or nothing. But an example
cannot be found except in experience, which never presents to us
anything more than phenomena; and thus the proposition means nothing
more than that the conception which contains only affirmatives does
not contain anything negative- a proposition nobody ever doubted.
If by intelligible objects we understand things which can be thought
by means of the pure categories, without the need of the schemata of
sensibility, such objects are impossible. For the condition of the
objective use of all our conceptions of understanding is the mode of
our sensuous intuition, whereby objects are given; and, if we make
abstraction of the latter, the former can have no relation to an
object. And even if we should suppose a different kind of intuition
from our own, still our functions of thought would have no use or
signification in respect thereof. But if we understand by the term,
objects of a non-sensuous intuition, in respect of which our
categories are not valid, and of which we can accordingly have no
knowledge (neither intuition nor conception), in this merely
negative sense noumena must be admitted. For this is no more than
saying that our mode of intuition is not applicable to all things, but
only to objects of our senses, that consequently its objective
validity is limited, and that room is therefore left for another
kind of intuition, and thus also for things that may be objects of it.
But in this sense the conception of a noumenon is problematical,
that is to say, it is the notion of that it that it is possible, nor
that it is impossible, inasmuch as we do not know of any mode of
intuition besides the sensuous, or of any other sort of conceptions
than the categories- a mode of intuition and a kind of conception
neither of which is applicable to a non-sensuous object. We are on
this account incompetent to extend the sphere of our objects of
thought beyond the conditions of our sensibility, and to assume the
existence of objects of pure thought, that is, of noumena, inasmuch as
these have no true positive signification. For it must be confessed of
the categories that they are not of themselves sufficient for the
cognition of things in themselves and, without the data of
sensibility, are mere subjective forms of the unity of the
understanding. Thought is certainly not a product of the senses, and
in so far is not limited by them, but it does not therefore follow
that it may be employed purely and without the intervention of
sensibility, for it would then be without reference to an object.
And we cannot call a noumenon an object of pure thought; for the
representation thereof is but the problematical conception of an
object for a perfectly different intuition and a perfectly different
understanding from ours, both of which are consequently themselves
problematical. The conception of a noumenon is therefore not the
conception of an object, but merely a problematical conception
inseparably connected with the limitation of our sensibility. That
is to say, this conception contains the answer to the question: "Are
there objects quite unconnected with, and independent of, our
intuition?"- a question to which only an indeterminate answer can be
given. That answer is: "Inasmuch as sensuous intuition does not
apply to all things without distinction, there remains room for
other and different objects." The existence of these problematical
objects is therefore not absolutely denied, in the absence of a
determinate conception of them, but, as no category is valid in
respect of them, neither must they be admitted as objects for our
understanding.
Understanding accordingly limits sensibility, without at the same
time enlarging its own field. While, moreover, it forbids
sensibility to apply its forms and modes to things in themselves and
restricts it to the sphere of phenomena, it cogitates an object in
itself, only, however, as a transcendental object, which is the
cause of a phenomenon (consequently not itself a phenomenon), and
which cannot be thought either as a quantity or as reality, or as
substance (because these conceptions always require sensuous forms
in which to determine an object)- an object, therefore, of which we
are quite unable to say whether it can be met with in ourselves or out
of us, whether it would be annihilated together with sensibility,
or, if this were taken away, would continue to exist. If we wish to
call this object a noumenon, because the representation of it is
non-sensuous, we are at liberty to do so. But as we can apply to it
none of the conceptions of our understanding, the representation is
for us quite void, and is available only for the indication of the
limits of our sensuous intuition, thereby leaving at the same time
an empty space, which we are competent to fill by the aid neither of
possible experience, nor of the pure understanding.
The critique of the pure understanding, accordingly, does not permit
us to create for ourselves a new field of objects beyond those which
are presented to us as phenomena, and to stray into intelligible
worlds; nay, it does not even allow us to endeavour to form so much as
a conception of them. The specious error which leads to this- and
which is a perfectly excusable one- lies in the fact that the
employment of the understanding, contrary to its proper purpose and
destination, is made transcendental, and objects, that is, possible
intuitions, are made to regulate themselves according to
conceptions, instead of the conceptions arranging themselves according
to the intuitions, on which alone their own objective validity
rests. Now the reason of this again is that apperception, and with
it thought, antecedes all possible determinate arrangement of
representations. Accordingly we think something in general and
determine it on the one hand sensuously, but, on the other,
distinguish the general and in abstracto represented object from
this particular mode of intuiting it. In this case there remains a
mode of determining the object by mere thought, which is really but
a logical form without content, which, however, seems to us to be a
mode of the existence of the object in itself (noumenon), without
regard to intuition which is limited to our senses.
Before ending this transcendental analytic, we must make an
addition, which, although in itself of no particular importance, seems
to be necessary to the completeness of the system. The highest
conception, with which a transcendental philosophy commonly begins, is
the division into possible and impossible. But as all division
presupposes a divided conception, a still higher one must exist, and
this is the conception of an object in general- problematically
understood and without its being decided whether it is something or
nothing. As the categories are the only conceptions which apply to
objects in general, the distinguishing of an object, whether it is
something or nothing, must proceed according to the order and
direction of the categories.
1. To the categories of quantity, that is, the conceptions of all,
many, and one, the conception which annihilates all, that is, the
conception of none, is opposed. And thus the object of a conception,
to which no intuition can be found to correspond, is = nothing. That
is, it is a conception without an object (ens rationis), like noumena,
which cannot be considered possible in the sphere of reality, though
they must not therefore be held to be impossible- or like certain
new fundamental forces in matter, the existence of which is
cogitable without contradiction, though, as examples from experience
are not forthcoming, they must not be regarded as possible.
2. Reality is something; negation is nothing, that is, a
conception of the absence of an object, as cold, a shadow (nihil
privativum).
3. The mere form of intuition, without substance, is in itself no
object, but the merely formal condition of an object (as
phenomenon), as pure space and pure time. These are certainly
something, as forms of intuition, but are not themselves objects which
are intuited (ens imaginarium).
4. The object of a conception which is self-contradictory, is
nothing, because the conception is nothing- is impossible, as a figure
composed of two straight lines (nihil negativum).
The table of this division of the conception of nothing (the
corresponding division of the conception of something does not require
special description) must therefore be arranged as follows:
NOTHING
AS
1
As Empty Conception
without object,
ens rationis
2 3
Empty object of Empty intuition
a conception, without object,
nihil privativum ens imaginarium
4
Empty object
without conception,
nihil negativum
We see that the ens rationis is distinguished from the nihil
negativum or pure nothing by the consideration that the former must
not be reckoned among possibilities, because it is a mere fiction-
though not self-contradictory, while the latter is completely
opposed to all possibility, inasmuch as the conception annihilates
itself. Both, however, are empty conceptions. On the other hand,
the nihil privativum and ens imaginarium are empty data for
conceptions. If light be not given to the senses, we cannot
represent to ourselves darkness, and if extended objects are not
perceived, we cannot represent space. Neither the negation, nor the
mere form of intuition can, without something real, be an object.
