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The Critique of Pure Reason: Of the Supreme Principle of all Synthetical Judgements.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)

  SECTION II. Of the Supreme Principle of all Synthetical Judgements.



  The explanation of the possibility of synthetical judgements is a

task with which general logic has nothing to do; indeed she needs

not even be acquainted with its name. But in transcendental logic it

is the most important matter to be dealt with- indeed the only one, if

the question is of the possibility of synthetical judgements a priori,

the conditions and extent of their validity. For when this question is

fully decided, it can reach its aim with perfect ease, the

determination, to wit, of the extent and limits of the pure

understanding.

  In an analytical judgement I do not go beyond the given

conception, in order to arrive at some decision respecting it. If

the judgement is affirmative, I predicate of the conception only

that which was already cogitated in it; if negative, I merely

exclude from the conception its contrary. But in synthetical

judgements, I must go beyond the given conception, in order to

cogitate, in relation with it, something quite different from that

which was cogitated in it, a relation which is consequently never

one either of identity or contradiction, and by means of which the

truth or error of the judgement cannot be discerned merely from the

judgement itself.

  Granted, then, that we must go out beyond a given conception, in

order to compare it synthetically with another, a third thing is

necessary, in which alone the synthesis of two conceptions can

originate. Now what is this tertium quid that is to be the medium of

all synthetical judgements? It is only a complex in which all our

representations are contained, the internal sense to wit, and its form

a priori, time.

  The synthesis of our representations rests upon the imagination;

their synthetical unity (which is requisite to a judgement), upon

the unity of apperception. In this, therefore, is to be sought the

possibility of synthetical judgements, and as all three contain the

sources of a priori representations, the possibility of pure

synthetical judgements also; nay, they are necessary upon these

grounds, if we are to possess a knowledge of objects, which rests

solely upon the synthesis of representations.

  If a cognition is to have objective reality, that is, to relate to

an object, and possess sense and meaning in respect to it, it is

necessary that the object be given in some way or another. Without

this, our conceptions are empty, and we may indeed have thought by

means of them, but by such thinking we have not, in fact, cognized

anything, we have merely played with representation. To give an

object, if this expression be understood in the sense of "to

present" the object, not mediately but immediately in intuition, means

nothing else than to apply the representation of it to experience,

be that experience real or only possible. Space and time themselves,

pure as these conceptions are from all that is empirical, and

certain as it is that they are represented fully a priori in the mind,

would be completely without objective validity, and without sense

and significance, if their necessary use in the objects of

experience were not shown. Nay, the representation of them is a mere

schema, that always relates to the reproductive imagination, which

calls up the objects of experience, without which they have no

meaning. And so it is with all conceptions without distinction.

  The possibility of experience is, then, that which gives objective

reality to all our a priori cognitions. Now experience depends upon

the synthetical unity of phenomena, that is, upon a synthesis

according to conceptions of the object of phenomena in general, a

synthesis without which experience never could become knowledge, but

would be merely a rhapsody of perceptions, never fitting together into

any connected text, according to rules of a thoroughly united

(possible) consciousness, and therefore never subjected to the

transcendental and necessary unity of apperception. Experience has

therefore for a foundation, a priori principles of its form, that is

to say, general rules of unity in the synthesis of phenomena, the

objective reality of which rules, as necessary conditions even of

the possibility of experience can which rules, as necessary

conditions- even of the possibility of experience- can always be shown

in experience. But apart from this relation, a priori synthetical

propositions are absolutely impossible, because they have no third

term, that is, no pure object, in which the synthetical unity can

exhibit the objective reality of its conceptions.

  Although, then, respecting space, or the forms which productive

imagination describes therein, we do cognize much a priori in

synthetical judgements, and are really in no need of experience for

this purpose, such knowledge would nevertheless amount to nothing

but a busy trifling with a mere chimera, were not space to be

considered as the condition of the phenomena which constitute the

material of external experience. Hence those pure synthetical

judgements do relate, though but mediately, to possible experience, or

rather to the possibility of experience, and upon that alone is

founded the objective validity of their synthesis.

  While then, on the one hand, experience, as empirical synthesis,

is the only possible mode of cognition which gives reality to all

other synthesis; on the other hand, this latter synthesis, as

cognition a priori, possesses truth, that is, accordance with its

object, only in so far as it contains nothing more than what is

necessary to the synthetical unity of experience.

  Accordingly, the supreme principle of all synthetical judgements is:

"Every object is subject to the necessary conditions of the

synthetical unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible

experience."

  A priori synthetical judgements are possible when we apply the

formal conditions of the a priori intuition, the synthesis of the

imagination, and the necessary unity of that synthesis in a

transcendental apperception, to a possible cognition of experience,

and say: "The conditions of the possibility of experience in general

are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of

experience, and have, for that reason, objective validity in an a

priori synthetical judgement."

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This World Wide Web document is a personal research project motivated by the following claim: "Truth is the object of Knowledge of whatever kind; and when we inquire what is meant by Truth, I suppose it is right to answer that Truth means facts and their relations, which stand towards each other pretty much as subjects and predicates in logic. All that exists, as contemplated by the human mind, forms one large system or complex fact, and this of course resolves itself into an indefinite number of particular facts, which, as being portions of a whole, have countless relations of every kind, one towards another." (The Idea of a University, John Henry Newman, 1801-1890)


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